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1. INTRODUCTION
This Article is concerned with the potential liability of those who
disseminate false or inaccurate information that causes physical injury or
property damage to those who rely upon it. However, this Article will not
address the question of whether those who advocate or depict violence or other
antisocial activities should also be subject to liability.' For the most part, such
publications are considered to be a form of constitutionally protected speech,
even when they directly cause physical harm to others.2 Although the issue of
liability for the publication of factually inaccurate information is narrower in
scope than liability for the publication of bad ideas, a surprising amount of
variation exists regarding how courts treat those who publish such information.3
Liability may be based on whether the information relates to the sale of a
product, whether it is embodied in a product, or whether it is disseminated
electronically or in some kind of tangible form.4 This Article will try to
determine whether any of these distinctions are relevant to the type of liability
applicable to those who publish inaccurate information.
1. See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Application of Product Liability Principles to
Publishers of Violent or Sexually Explicit Materials, 52 FLA. L. REV. 603 (2000) (discussing the
potential imposition of liability with respect to publishers of violent or sexually explicit material and
potential first amendment protections); Paul E. Salamanca, Video Games as a Protected Form of
Expression, 40 GA. L. REV. 153 (2005) (discussing the potential for liability with respect to violent
or sexually explicit video games and first amendment protections afforded to them).
2. See, e.g., Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1152 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (finding no tort
liability where wrongful acts were based on protected speech), aff'd, 958 F.2d 1084 (11th Cir. 1992)
(unpublished decision); Zamora v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 206 (S.D. Fla. 1979)
(holding that broadcasting conduct that incited violence was protected speech); McCollum v. CBS,
Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 198 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that music producers were not liable for
suicide of listener); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (Mass. 1989)
(holding that production, distribution, and exhibition of violence was protected speech). But see,
e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 266-67 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that an
instructional manual on murder was not protected speech and that the book's publisher could be
liable for aiding and abetting a triple murder when the publisher stipulated that they marketed the
book to would-be murderers); Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681, 691 (La. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that the production of a movie that inspired a shooting was not protected speech because it
fell within the incitement to imminent lawless activity exception to the First Amendment).
3. See 2 DAvID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 20:9, at
481-84, 485 & nn. 34-35 (3d ed. 2000) (footnotes omitted).
4. See 1 id. § 3:1, at 79.
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The Article begins by examining the existing state of the law in this area.
Part II focuses on liability for information associated with the marketing or sale
of a product. In such cases, liability for product sellers may arise from product
descriptions in advertising6 or express warranties, as well as mistakes in
instructions and warnings. Potential liability theories include negligence,
misrepresentation, breach of warranty, and strict liability in tort.7  Part III
examines liability for inaccurate information published in books, magazines, and
other tangible media. Although plaintiffs have invoked a variety of theories,
such as negligence and strict liability in tort, courts have generally refused to
impose liability either on doctrinal grounds or because of concerns about the
chilling effect of tort liability on the free exchange of ideas.
Part IV ventures into the largely unexplored area of liability for information
embodied in computer programs and the more conventional forms of information
disseminated over the Internet. Because there are no reported cases on the
subject, it is difficult to predict what sort of liability rule would apply to those
who sell computer programs. In theory, stand-alone computer programs could
be considered goods and, therefore, subject to sales warranties under the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC);9 however, it is less certain that courts will
also treat them as products for purposes of applying strict principles.10 On the
other hand, consumers may be able to recover against product sellers when
defective computer programs embedded in a product cause it to malfunction. In
addition, Part IV considers which liability rules currently apply to inaccurate
information that is made available to the public over the Internet. What little
case law there is suggests that courts will impose liability of some sort when the
information provider is trying to sell a product, but not otherwise.
Finally, Part V considers a bifurcated liability standard that distinguishes
between commercial and noncommercial information. Part V also concludes
that a negligence standard is appropriate for those who disseminate information
of a commercial nature. However, publishers of noncommercial information
should be subject to tort liability only if they breach an express warranty or
engage in fraudulent misrepresentation.
5. See 1 id. § 1:5, at 17.
6. See 1 id. § 2:7, at 62.
7. See 1 id. § 1:5, at 15.
8. See 2 id. § 20:9, at 481 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 19 cmt. d (1998)).
9. Goods are defined as "all things that are movable when a security interest
attaches.... [including] a computer program embedded in goods and any supporting information
provided in connection with a transaction relating to the program." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44) (2013).
10. A product is defined as "tangible personal property distributed commercially for use or
consumption." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19 (1998).
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II. LIABILITY FOR INACCURATE PRODUCT WARNINGS AND INSTRUCTIONS
Factual statements associated with products can appear in a variety of forms,
including product labels and packaging, brochures and other sales literature,
owner's manuals, sales contracts, instructional or promotional videos, service
bulletins, and certain specialized materials such as material safety data sheets
(MSDS) and preliminary design review (PDR) entries. When these statements
are inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading-and thereby cause injury-accident
victims may seek compensation by invoking theories such as breach of express
warranty, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and strict liability in tort.11 When
the claim is based on breach of warranty or misrepresentation, liability can arise
directly from the information itself. However, when the claim is based on strict
liability in tort under the "failure-to-warn" theory, most courts impose liability
because the product-rather than the information provided-is defective. 12
A. Liability Theories
Plaintiffs usually rely on breach of warranty or misrepresentation when
claiming that statements in product literature are factually inaccurate.13 In other
cases, strict liability in tort is the preferred theory of liability.14
1. Breach ofExpress Warranty
The law of express warranty is codified in section 2-313 of the UCC, which
declares that "[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise."15
Express warranties may arise from descriptions of the product, as well as
statements or promises that appear in labels, packaging, or sales literature.16
Some states refuse to allow consumers to sue for breach of express warranty
unless they have actually relied on the seller's statements or promises;17 other
states have dispensed with this requirement.18
11. See 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.5, at 15.
12. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 99, at 697 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that a strict liability action for failure to warn "is really nothing
more than a ground of negligence liability described as the sale of a product in a defective
condition").
13. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 3, § 4:1, at 121.
14. Id.
15. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (2012).
16. See id. §§ 2-313(1)(b), -313(2) (2012).
17. See, e.g., Wendt v. Beardmore Suburban Chevrolet, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Neb.
1985) ("Since an express warranty must have been 'made part of the basis of the bargain,' it is
essential that the plaintiffs prove reliance upon the warranty."); Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber &
Cedar Co., 891 A.2d 477, 500 (N.H. 2005) (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 564
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2. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Misrepresentation involves the communication of false or misleading
information to another person. Misrepresentation is often called "fraud" or
"deceit" when a defendant knows that a statement is false and makes it to
mislead the plaintiff.20  If the scienter requirement cannot be met, an injured
party may still sue for negligent misrepresentation. 2 1  The drafters of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts pioneered the introduction of "innocent"
22
misrepresentation in the 1960s. Although very few states embraced this
concept,23 it was retained in the new Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability (Products Liability Restatement) when it was promulgated in 1998.24
3. Strict Liability in Tort
The concept of strict liability for the sale of defective products was first
incorporated into the Restatement (Second) of Torts almost fif years ago.2 It
is now codified in the new Products Liability Restatement. Under strict
liability principles, manufacturerS27-as well as others in the distributive
(3d Cir. 1990); Torres v. Nw. Eng'g Co., 949 P.2d 1004, 1013 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997)) ("A majority
of jurisdictions continues [sic] to find that reliance is an essential element of an express warranty
claim.").
18. See, e.g., Martin v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 116 F.3d 102, 105 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing
Daughtrey v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336, 338 (Va. 1992)) (noting that any description of the goods is a
part of the basis of the bargain and, therefore, "[it is unnecessary that the buyer actually rely upon
it"); Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he majority ofjurisdictions ... have found it unnecessary to require reliance from the buyer."); Keith v. Buchanan,
220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 398 (Ct. App. 1985) ("The representation need only be a part of the basis of the
bargain, or merely a factor or consideration inducing the buyer to enter into the bargain.").
19. DAvID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 3.1, at 113 (2d ed. 2008).
20. Estate of Schwarz v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 1356 P.3d 409, 423 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (citing
U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Fought, 630 P.3d 337, 351 (Or. 1981)).
21. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Chi. v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 591 (111. 1989) (noting
that liability for negligent misrepresentation does not require that the defendant "know that the
statement is false. His own carelessness or negligence in ascertaining its truth will suffice");
Snelten v. Schmidt Implement Co., 647 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (111. App. Ct. 1995) (stating that the
elements of negligent misrepresentation are the same as fraud except the defendant is not required to
know the statement was false).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B cmt. a (1965).
23. OWEN, supra note 19, § 3.4, at 140.
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 9 cmt. b (1998).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a (1965).
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998).
27. See, e.g., Dayton Tire & Rubber Co. v. Davis, 348 So. 2d 575, 581-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hughes, 358 So. 2d
1339 (Fla. 1978)) (discussing a manufacturer's "strict duty to warn" of a product's risks); Scheman-
Gonzalez v. Saber Mfg. Co., 816 So. 2d 1133, 1139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Brito v. Cnty.
of Palm Beach, 753 So. 2d 109, 112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Roy, 466 So.
2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)) ("[A] manufacturer has a duty to warn where its
product... has dangerous propensities."); Jone v. Coleman Co., 183 S.W.3d 600, 609 (Mo. Ct.
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chain 28-have a duty to provide adequate warnings about product-related risks to
foreseeable users of their products. Manufacturers are also responsible for
providing instructions for the safe operation of their products. 3 0  In theory,
App. 2005) (citing Duke v. Gulf& W. Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 418 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)) ("The
fact remains that the manufacturer of an inherently dangerous product has a duty to warn ultimate
users."); Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 700 N.E.2d 303, 305 (N.Y. 1998) (citing Rastelli v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 373, 376 (1992)) (holding that a manufacturer has a duty to warn
against dangers that could harm foreseeable users).
28. See, e.g., Adams v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 923 So. 2d 118, 123 (La. Ct. App.
2005) ("[A] non-manufacturer/seller... has a duty to warn a purchaser of defects... in the
products he sells.").
29. See M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criticism,
89 W. VA. L. REV. 221, 279 (1987) (citing Hammond v. N. Am. Asbestos Corp., 454 N.E.2d 210
(111. 1983); Venus v. O'Hara, 468 N.E.2d 405 (111. App. Ct. 1984)). This also requires sellers to test
their products or otherwise investigate to discover the existence of product-related risks. See, e.g.,
Richter v. Limax Int'l, Inc., 45 F.3d 1464, 1470 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that Kansas imposes a duty
on manufacturers to test and inspect products for safety); Cartwright v. Pfizer, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d
876, 886 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (citing Wood v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 119 S.W.3d 870, 873 (Tex. App.
2003)) (stating that Texas law requires testing of products to determine necessity of warnings);
Elam v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 841 N.E.2d 1037, 1045 (111. App. Ct. 2005) (finding that manufacturer
could be liable for failing to investigate risks after receiving advice on dangers of product); Baylie
v. Swift & Co., 670 N.E.2d 772, 782 (111. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that sufficient evidence existed to
determine that manufacturer had the ability to test the product, but failed to do so); Lindquist v.
Ayerst Labs., Inc., 607 P.2d 1339, 1350 (Kan. 1980) (quoting 1 ROBERT D. HURSH & HENRY J.
BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2:29, at 214 (2d ed. 1974)) (recognizing a
manufacturer's duty to test and inspect the product for risks and safety). This is distinct from a
manufacturer's duty to design a safe product; therefore, a plaintiff does not have to elect between
these two liability theories. Gosewisch v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 737 P.2d 376, 379 (Ariz. 1987).
30. See, e.g., Duford v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 833 F.2d 407, 411-12 (1st Cir. 1987)
(reasoning that the jury could have found defendants liable due to inadequacy of warnings or
unclear instructions); Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147, 1152 (Cal. 1984) (noting the
possible warning requirement for instructions on product usage); Midgley v. S.S. Kresge Co., 127
Cal. Rptr. 217, 219 (Ct. App. 1976) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cint. j
(1965)) (stating that the seller may be required to give instructions or warnings on proper product
usage); E. Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1122-3 (D.C. 1990) (footnotes omitted)
(citations omitted) (holding that defendants were responsible for providing specific instructions on
how to use a product); Payne v. Soft Sheen Prods., Inc., 486 A.2d 712, 724 (D.C. 1985) (upholding
the jury's finding of insufficient instructions on product usage); Edwards v. Cal. Chem. Co., 245 So.
2d 259, 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (finding a warning label inadequate when it failed to instruct
on proper usage and necessary precautions users should take); Miller v. Rinker Boat Co, 815 N.E.2d
1219, 1239-41 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (citations omitted) (noting that strict liability can result from a
manufacturer's failure to provide instructions on how to use a product); Cook v. Ford Motor Co.,
913 N.E.2d 311, 319-20 (nd. Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted) (discussing manufacturer's duty to
include warnings about product usage); Hooker v. Super Prods. Corp., 751 So. 2d 889, 907 (La. Ct.
App. 1999) (finding liability from the manufacturer's failure to warn about known dangers of
personal product repair); Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2004) (citing
Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 1977)) ("The duty to warn includes
the duty to give adequate instructions for the safe use of the product."); Tompkins v. Log Sys., Inc.,
385 S.E.2d 545, 548 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing manufacturers failure to provide complete
instructions on product usage).
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31warnings and instructions are different. Warnings inform consumers about
inherent, product-related risks, thereby enabling consumers to encounter the
risks safely or avoid them altogether by not using the product.32 Instructions, on
the other hand, inform consumers about how to avoid unnecessary risks by using
the product properly. 3 3
34 35Most courts and commentators agree that the duty to warn is the same
under theories of negligence and strict liability. However, each of these theories
has a different focus. In a negligence case, liability is determined based on
whether the defendant exercised due care in deciding whether to warn about a
particular risk and in formulating that warning.36 In other words, the court looks
to the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct.3 7  In a strict liability case,
however, liability is based on the condition of the product.38 Thus, the seller will
31. See, e.g., McConnell v. Cosco, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 970, 977 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (noting
that warnings must disclose risks beyond mere instructions); Shuras v. Integrated Project Servs.,
Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 194, 201 (D. Mass. 2002) ("Instructions on the use of a product does not
discharge a manufacturer's duty to warn."); Hiigel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 988 (Colo.
1975) (citing Anderson v. Klix Chem. Co., 472 P.2d 806, 810 (Or. 1970)) (noting that the duty to
warn is not satisfied by only providing instructions on product use); Brown v. Glade & Grove
Supply, Inc., 647 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (determining that providing advice
on proper use is an instruction, not a warning); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 99 (Minn.
1987) (finding that directions on how to park a vehicle did not constitute warnings about the risks of
parking a vehicle); D'Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 310 A.2d 106, 110 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973)
("[T]he duty to warn is not discharged by the mere presence of directions for use on the product, no
matter how clear their meaning.").
32. Salinas v. Amteck of Ky., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing
Johnson v. Am. Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905 (Cal. 2008)); Byrne v. SCM Corp., 538 N.E.2d 796,
811 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (citing Collins v. Sunnyside Corp., 496 N.E.2d 1155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)).
33. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 860 (5th Cir. 1967) (citing Hardy Cross
Dillard & Harris Hart, II, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L.
REv. 145, 147 (1955)); McGee v. Corometrics Med. Sys., Inc., 487 So. 2d 886, 893 (Ala. 1986)
(quoting Helene Curtis Indus, Inc., 385 F.2d at 860); Jerry J. Phillips, A Synopsis ofthe Developing
Law ofProducts Liability, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 317, 350 (1978-1979); Victor E. Schwartz & Russell
W. Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Need for a Synthesis of Law and Communication
Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 38, 52 (1983).
34. See, e.g., Cooley v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 478 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (App. Div. 1984)
(noting that when failure to adequately warn is alleged, "negligence and strict liability are
equivalent").
35. See, e.g., James B. Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe Use in Strict Tort
Liability, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 521, 546 (1981) (noting that "[o]ther jurisdictions... perceive the
theories of strict tort liability and negligence ... [as] providing essentially identical standards for
the duty to warn").
36. See, e.g., Croskey v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 532 F.3d 511, 515 (6th Cir. 2008) ("A
negligence claim in a products liability action looks to the manufacturer's conduct. . . ."); Gregory
v. Cincinnati, Inc. 538 N.W.2d 325, 328-29 (Mich. 1995) (noting that the balancing test of risk and
utility is employed to determine a manufacturer's exercise of due care).
37. Giglio v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 429 A.2d 486, 489 (Conn. 1980) ("The doctrine of
strict liability is concerned with the character of the product injected into the stream of commerce,
not with the specific conduct of the defendant.").
38. Gregory, 538 N.W.2d at 329 & n.8 (citing Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176,
186 (Mich. 1984)).
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be liable if the product is defective, unreasonably dangerous, or not reasonably
safe.39 If the manufacturer fails to provide adequate warnings or instructions in
appropriate circumstances then a product that is otherwise properly made would
still be deemed defective and unreasonably dangerous. 40
In a failure-to-warn case, the court must first decide whether the seller owes
a duty to warn about the particular risk in question. 4 1  This issue is usually
treated as a question of law, rather than a factual matter for the jury to decide.
In many states, courts have concluded that a defendant has no duty to warn if the
risk is an obvious one that should be known to the consumer.43  Once a court
39. See, e.g., Croskey, 532 F.3d at 515-16 (discussing that a plaintiff can show the product
was not reasonably safe in order to establish a design defect); Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. &
Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 716 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727
F.2d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984)) (noting that a product can be defective because it was made
unreasonably dangerous by way of failing to include adequate warnings).
40. See, e.g., Croskey, 532 F.3d at 515 n.2 (citing Gregory, 538 N.W.2d at 329) ("A
negligent failure to warn renders a product defective even if the design chosen does not render the
product defective."); Koonce, 798 F.2d at 716 (citing Pavlides, 727 F.2d at 338) (stating the absence
of warnings renders a product unreasonably dangerous, and, therefore, defective even if the product
is otherwise properly made); Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 811 (9th Cir.
1974) (citing Davis v. Wyeth Labs., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968)) (noting that a product may be
"perfectly manufactured" but still be unreasonably dangerous due to the failure to warn); Lee v.
Butcher Boy, 215 Cal. Rptr. 195, 201 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, Inc.,
157 Cal. Rptr. 142, 147 (Ct. App. 1979)) ("Even if a product is faultlessly made, if may be found
defective if it is unreasonably dangerous . . . without adequate warnings."); Canifax v. Hercules
Powder Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 552, 558 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (noting that a manufacturer will be liable
for a flawlessly made product when the lack of adequate warnings makes the product unreasonably
dangerous); Giglio, 429 A.2d at 489 ("The failure to warn ... is, of itself, a defect." (quoting
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 659 (4th ed. 1971))); Hunter v. Werner Co., 574 S.E.2d 426,
431 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Battersby v. Boyer, 526 S.E.2d 159, 162 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999))
(noting that a failure to adequately warn renders a product even when the product is otherwise safe
for use); Wise v. Ford Motor Co., 943 P.2d 1310, 1314 (Mont. 1997) (citing Krueger v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 783 P.2d 1340, 1348 (Mont. 1989); Brown v. N. Am. Mfg. Co., 576 P.2d 711, 718-
19 (Mont. 1978)) (observing that an otherwise technically sound product is defective when the
manufacturer fails to warn); Lucas v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372, 377 (Tex. 1984) (citing
Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 346 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983); Miller v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 568 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. 1977)) (observing that a product may be defective solely due
to a failure to warn of risks).
41. See, e.g., Schultz v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 584 N.E.2d 235, 242 (111. App. Ct. 1991)
(citations omitted) (noting that the determination of whether the manufacturer's duty to warn exists
is a question of law for the court and the plaintiff must establish this in order to establish a products
liability claim).
42. Schaffer v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 74 F.3d 722, 729 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing
Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 269 (Ohio 1989)); Schultz, 584 N.E.2d at 242 (citing Genaust
v. Ill. Power Co., 343 N.E.2d 465, 471 (111. 1976); Mason v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 487 N.E.2d
1043, 1048 (111. App. Ct. 1985)); Anderson v. Shaughnessy, 519 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994), rev'd, 526 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1995) (citing Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128,
133 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)).
43. See, e.g., Greene v. A.P. Prods., Ltd., 717 N.W.2d 855, 859-60 (Mich. 2006) (citing
MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 600.2948(2) (West 2012)) ("[A] manufacturer has no duty to warn of a
material risk associated with the use of the product if the risk ... is obvious, or should be
obvious... ").
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concludes that the manufacturer has a duty to warn, the jury must then determine
whether the warning actually given was adequate.4 The adequacy of the
warning issue, as well as the causation issue, 45 is usually regarded as a question
of fact for the jury to decide.4 6
Assuming that a warning is given, it must be adequate-that is, the warning
must be reasonable under the circumstances. 4 7  The adequacy of a warning
involves a consideration of a number of factors.48 First, a warning must provide
complete information about all significant risks associated with the products'
use. Each risk must be specifically identified.50 For example, an Arizona court
44. Smith v. Louisville Ladder Co., 237 F.3d 515, 522 (5th Cir. 2001); Zettle v. Handy Mfg.
Co., 837 F. Supp. 222, 227 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (citing Hill v. Husky Briquetting, Inc., 220 N.W.2d
137, 141 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974)); Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1499 (D. Kan. 1987)
(citing Wooderson v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1056 (Kan. 1984)); see also Ortho
Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (citing Spruill v. Boyle-
Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 86 (4th Cir. 1962)).
45. See, e.g., Goodner v. Hyundai Motor Co., 650 F.3d 1034, 1044 (5th Cir. 2011)
("[Clausation generally is a question of fact for the jury." (quoting Flock v. Scripto-Tokai Corp.,
319 F.3d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 2003))); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 209 (N.Y.
1983) (noting that "it would be proper for the jury to decide whether the defective design was a
substantial factor causing plaintiffs injury").
46. Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1983); Bryant v.
Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Dougherty v. Hooker Chem.
Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1976); Anderson v. Heron Eng'g Co., 604 P.2d 674, 679 (Colo.
1979)); Kovach v. Alpharma, Inc., 890 N.E.2d 55, 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), vacated, 913 N.E.2d
193 (Ind. 2009) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Rushford, 868 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2007)); Alm v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex. 1986) (citing Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)); see also Fyssakis v. Knight Equip.
Corp., 826 P.2d 570, 571-72 (Nev. 1992).
47. Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 853 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Brochu v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981)).
48. Anderson v. Hedstrom Corp, 76 F. Supp. 2d 422, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Werckenthein v.
Bucher Petrochemical Co., 618 N.E.2d 902, 908-09 (111. App. Ct. 1993) (citing Taylor v. Gerry's
Ridgewood, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 987, 992 (111. App. Ct. 1986)) (analyzing the adequacy of warnings by
looking at a number of factors).
49. Thornton v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 22 F.3d 284, 289 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, 727 F.2d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984)); Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
939 F.2d 1293, 1300 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Jackson v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d
1314, 1320 (5th Cir. 1985)), afj'd in part, rev'd in part, 952 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1992); Pavlides v.
Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637
F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85 (App. Div. 1979);
Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), af'd on other grounds,
411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969)); Reid v. BMW ofN. Am., 430 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1373 (N.D. Ga. 2006)
(quoting Pavlides, 727 F.2d at 338), amended by, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Deines v.
Vermeer Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 350, 353 (D. Kan. 1990) (citing Wooderson v. Ortho Pharm. Corp.,
681 P.2d 1038, 1062 (Kan. 1984)); Cooley v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 478 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377-78
(App. Div. 1984) (quoting Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. N. Propane Gas Co., 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009
(App. Div. 1980)); Eddleman v. Scalco, 484 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Tex. App. 1972) (quoting Rurnsey v.
Freeway Mano Minimax, 423 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968)); see also Gean v. Cling Surface
Co., 971 F.2d 642, 644 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Entrekin v. Atl. Richfield Co., 519 So. 2d 447, 449
(Ala. 1987); Casrell v. Altec Indus., 335 So. 2d 128, 132-33 (Ala. 1976)); Hayes v. Spartan Chem.
Co., 622 So. 2d 1352, 1354-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.
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in Tucson Industries, Inc. v. Schwartz5 1 held that the warnings on a container of
contact adhesive were inadequate because they warned about flammabilitp, but
did not disclose that fumes from the product could cause blindness. In
addition, the warning must reveal the actual likelihood and gravity of such risks
when they are known by the manufacturer.53 Applying this principle, in
Martinkovic v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,54 a federal district court ruled that a
jury might conclude that the defendant's warning with respect to its DTP vaccine
was inadequate. 5  Although the package insert stated that the incidence of
convulsions from the vaccine was "exceedingly rare," the plaintiff introduced
expert testimony that the risk of convulsions might be as high as 1 in 300.56 This
evidence was sufficient to prevent the defendant from obtaining summary
judgment."
The physical format of the warning is also important. A warning will be
deemed inadequate if its print size is too small to be noticed by the user, 59 or if
1966)); Fiorentino v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 416 N.E.2d 998, 1003-04 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (citing
Murray v. Wilson Oak Flooring Co., 475 F.2d 129, 132-33 (7th Cir. 1973)); Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Saenz, 966 S.W.2d 545, 552 (Tex. App. 1997).
50. See, e.g., Tucson Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 501 P.2d 936, 941 (Ariz. 1972) (discussing
how disclosure of the exact risks, such as immediate blindness, associated with use of the product
would make the warning adequate); Zeigler v. CloWhite Co., 507 S.E.2d 182, 184 (Ga. Ct. App.
1998) (noting a lack of an adequate warning specifically pertaining to the use of a lemon scent to
disguise the use of bleach in the product); Mack v. Ford Motor Co., 669 N.E.2d 608, 610 (111. App.
Ct. 1996) (noting that the manufacturer had a duty to warn of the existence of a switch that disabled
the vehicle); First Nat'l Bank in Alberquerque v. Nor-Am Agric. Prods., Inc., 537 P.2d 682, 691
(N.M. Ct. App. 1975) ("The warning must designate specifically all of the dangers that may cause
serious injury . . . ." (quoting Comment, The Manufacturer's Duty to Warn of Dangers Involved in
Use ofa Product, 1967 WASH. U. L.Q. 206, 210 (1967))).
51. 501 P.2d 936 (Ariz. 1972).
52. Id.at941.
53. See, e.g., Martinkovic ex rel. Martinkovic v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 212, 216
(N.D. 111. 1987) (analyzing whether defendants knew or should have known of the actual incidence
of adverse reactions in the product); Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 579 P.2d 183, 187 (N.M. Ct. App.
1978) ("The warning must reasonably communicate the extent or seriousness of harn that could
result from the danger." (quoting First Nat'! Bank in Albuquerque, 537 P.2d at 691)); Benjamin v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 61 P.3d 257, 265 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that an expert testified that "a
warning should identify what the hazard is, the seriousness of the hazard, and the reason that it is
important"); Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. 1994) (noting that "a reasonable
waming ... wams with the degree of intensity required by the nature of the risk" (citing Seley v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981))).
54. 669 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. 111. 1987).
55. See id. at 216.
56. Id. (citation omitted).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Gardner v. Q. H. S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238, 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1971) (analyzing the
placement and size of a warning to determine adequacy); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d
79, 82, 86 (4th Cir. 1962) (describing in detail the prominence, position, size, and color of a
warning); Jones v. Amazing Prods., Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1242 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (discussing at
length the physical format of a warning label).
59. See, e.g., Gardner, 448 F.2d at 243 (noting font size as a factor in determining adequacy);
Spruill, 308 F.2d at 86 (examining the font size of a warning to determine prominence and
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the warning is not placed in a prominent position on the label. 0 If the risk is
particularly serious, the seller may be required to place a warning on the product
itself, rather than simply mentioning it in an owner's manual or other off-product
location. 6 1 Even when a warning is placed on the product itself, it must be
located where it is easily visible. 2 Thus, in Delery v. Prudential Insurance
Company,63 a Louisiana intermediate appellate court determined that a chair
manufacturer's warning-which was placed underneath the chair-was
inadequate because it was unlikely to be visible to an ordinary user.64
Third, a warning must be phrased with a degree of intensity that is
65
commensurate with the danger involved. A warning will also be considered
adequacy); Jones, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1247-48 (holding that a warning was inadequate due to its
miniscule font size); Am. Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer, 404 N.E.2d 606, 617-18 (nd. Ct. App.
1980) (holding that a warning was inadequate due to its miniscule font size), vacated, 457 N.E.2d
181 (Ind. 1983); Johnson v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., 876 N.Y.S.2d 577, 579 (App. Div. 2009)
(noting the small print size of the warning); Benjamin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 61 P.3d 257, 266
(Or. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Schmeiser v. Trus Joist Corp., 540 P.2d 998, 1004-05 (Or. 1975);
Anderson v. Klix Chem. Co., 472 P.2d 806, 810 (Or. 1970)) (finding that a jury could have found
the warning was not in a form to catch the attention of a reasonable user due to its size and color).
60. See, e.g., Derienzo v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 537, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(citing Arbaiza v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., No. CV 96-1224(RJD), 1998 WL 846773 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.
5, 1998)) ("A warning that is inconspicuously located ... may be deficient."); Nowak ex rel.
Nowak v. Faberge, U.S.A. Inc., 812 F. Supp. 492, 497-98 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that expert
testimony on the prominence of the label was a sufficient foundation for the jury to find
inadequacy), af'd, 32 F.3d 755 (3d Cir. 1994); D'Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 310 A.2d 106, 111 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973) (noting the importance of the prominence of the warning); Darsan v.
Guncalito Corp., 545 N.Y.S.2d 594, 596 (App. Div. 1989) (finding that the plaintiff produced
sufficient evidence to present to a jury on defendant's failure to display warning with sufficient
prominence); Maize v. Atl. Ref. Co., 41 A.2d 850, 852-53 (Pa. 1945) (noting that the word "safety"
was more prominent than the warning, leading the consumer to believe the product was safe).
61. See, e.g., Folsom v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 509 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1379-80
(M.D. Ga. 2007) (citing Camden Oil Co., LLC v. Jackson, 609 S.E.2d 356, 359 (Ga. Ct. App.
2004); Wilson Foods Corp. v. Turner, 460 S.E.2d 532, 534 (Ca. Ct. App. 1995)) (finding that a jury
could conclude the position of the label was not sufficiently conspicuous because the driver could
not see it while operating the jet-ski); McGarrigle v. Mercury Marine, 838 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293
(D.N.J. 2011) (noting that expert testimony was sufficiently reliable to establish that a warning
should be affixed to the product itself).
62. See, e.g., Jones v. P.K. Smith Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 444 So. 2d 1372, 1377 (La. Ct. App.
1984) (noting that despite location of the warning, if the warning "is not clearly visible [it] is not an
adequate warning" (quoting Andries v. Gen. Motors Corp., 444 So. 2d 1180, 1183 (La. 1983))).
63. 643 So. 2d 807 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
64. Id. at 814.
65. See, e.g., Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975) (finding
that a jury could reasonably conclude that the drug manufacturer's warning "lacked the emphasis
that the danger demanded"); Martinkovic ex rel. Martinkovic v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 669 F. Supp.
212, 216 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the wording
"extremely rare" clearly conveys the dangers of the vaccination); Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F.
Supp. 1225, 1248 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (noting that the duty to warn requires emphasis that would
"cause a reasonable man to exercise ... caution commensurate with the potential danger" (quoting
Schub v. Fox River Tractor Co., 218 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Wis. 1974))), rev'd on other grounds, 6
F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 210 (Colo. 1984) (noting that
expert testimony was not required to determine whether the company was negligent in failing to
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inadequate if it is ambiguous, equivocal, or contradictory.66  Thus, an Oregon
court declared that a jury could reasonably conclude that a reference to "acid" in
a cleaning product's labeling was not sufficient to warn the plaintiff that she
should wear rubber gloves while using the product. 67 In addition, an effective
warning must be written in such a way that it can be easily understood by its
intended audience.68 For example, in MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp.,69 a Massachusetts court agreed with the jury that the manufacturer of oral
contraceptives failed to adequately warn about the inherent risks of using its
birth control pills. 7 0 A booklet distributed by Ortho warned about "abnormal
blood clotting," but failed to use the more common term "stroke" to describe this
risk.71 Finally, an otherwise acceptable warning may be found inadequate if it
has not been communicated through the most effective channels. 72 This concept
provide a full warning of the significant dangers of the medicine); Seley v. G. D. Searle & Co., 423
N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ohio 1981) ("A reasonable warning ... warns with the degree of intensity
demanded by the nature of the risk."); Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 117, 131-32 (Ct.
App. 1983) (finding that the labeling and warning of a device "was inadequate to apprise the
doctors of the risk"); Scheman-Gonzalez v. Saber Mfg. Co., 816 So. 2d 1133, 1139 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2002) ("The warning should be ... commensurate with the potential danger." (quoting Am.
Cyanamid Co. v. Roy, 466 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984))); Miller v. Rinker Boat
Co., 815 N.E.2d 1219, 1240 (111. App. Ct. 2004) (noting that the plaintiff's expert concluded that the
warning was inadequate because it did not convey the seriousness of the risk); Mahr v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1230 (111. App. Ct. 1979) ("Implicit in the duty to warn is the duty to warn
with a degree of intensity that would cause a reasonable [person] to exercise ... caution . . . ."
(quoting Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416, 423-24 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)));
Richards v. Upjohn Co., 625 P.2d 1192, 1196 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that there was
evidence that the warnings were unclear and did not effectively communicate the dangers of product
use); Gen. Chem. Corp. v. De La Lastra, 815 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. App. 1991) ("Implicit in the
duty to warn is the duty to warn with a degree of intensity ... commensurate with the potential
danger." (quoting Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974))), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 852 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1993).
66. See, e.g., Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted)
(noting that an expert concluded "this was a very nebulous way of putting [the warning]."); Bean v.
Ross Mfg. Co., 344 S.W.2d 18, 23-24 (Mo. 1961) (analyzing the ambiguous and contradictory
nature of the warning); Anderson v. Klix Chem. Co., 472 P.2d 806, 810 (Or. 1970) (noting the
plaintiff's assertion that the warning was equivocal).
67. See Anderson, 472 P.2d at 809-10.
68. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmn. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 71-72 (Mass. 1985)
(holding that the jury could have concluded that the warning "failed to make the nature of the risk
reasonably comprehensible to the average consumer"); Gen. Chem. Corp., 815 S.W.2d at 754
(citing Bituminous Cas. Corp., 518 S.W.2d at 872-73) ("[A] warning ... is legally adequate if
it ... is of such a nature as to be comprehensible to the average user. . .
69. 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1984).
70. Id. at 70-71.
71. Id. at 66-67.
72. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Interstate Battery Sys., 722 F.2d 1517, 1519-20 (1lth Cir. 1984)
(determining that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether there were more effective
ways of communicating the warning), superseded by statute, 1987 Ga. Laws 1152-53; Yarrow v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.S.D. 1967) (analyzing the most effective way to
provide a warning for drugs already in use by doctors), aff'd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); Brown
v. Glade & Grove Supply, Inc., 647 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the
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is illustrated in Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 73 in which a federal district court
concluded that the manufacturer of Aralen-a prescription drug used in the
treatment of arthritis-failed to adequately warn the plaintiffs physician about
the risks of blindness because it relied on package inserts, product cards, and
other forms of literature, instead of directing its sales representatives to
personally warn doctors about this risk.74
B. Inaccurate Information in Connection with the Sale of a Product
As the cases illustrate below, although manufacturers and other sellers are
not liable for every kind of misstatement they make in connection with the sale
of a product, liability may be imposed in any number of situations. This includes
statements that inaccurately describe the nature of a product or its ingredients,75
unwarranted assurances of product safety, 6 misinformation about the existence
or nature of a particular risk,77 understatement of the seriousness of a particular
risk, 8 and inaccurate statements about product performance.79 Courts have also
imposed liability upon manufacturers who provide faulty information about the
assembly, operation, maintenance, and repair of their products.80
placement and manner of conveyance of the warning was not effective to apprise the user of the
danger); Richards v. Upjohn Co., 625 P.2d 1192, 1196 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) ("There is also
evidence that the warnings which were given ... were unclear, and that they did not effectively
communicate ... the dangers from using the drug .. ).
73. 263 F. Supp. 159.
74. Id. at 162-63.
75. See, e.g., Lane v. C.A. Swanson & Sons, 278 P.2d 723, 726 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955)
(finding defendant liable where the label on the can coupled with a newspaper advertisement
misrepresented that the canned chicken contained "no bones"); Kolarik v. Cory Int'l Corp., 721
N.W.2d 159, 166 (Iowa 2006) (finding it reasonable that consumers would expect pits to be
removed from a jar that claimed olives were "minced pimento stuffed").
76. See, e.g., Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081, 1093 (N.D. Ohio 1975)
(noting that the defendants advertised "that liquid plumr was 'safe' for ordinary household use,"
before it cause severe burns to plaintiffs face), af'd, 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978); McLachlan v.
Wilmington Dry Goods Co., 22 A.2d 851, 851 (Del. Super. Ct. 1941) (noting that defendant seller
gave an affirmation of fact that the dress was suitable for wear, when it actually contained injurious
and poisonous substances).
77. See, e.g., Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1235 (Kan. 1987) (affirming a jury
verdict for the plaintiff where the defendant falsely stated the product had a significantly lower
pregnancy rate than it actually did); Crocker v. Winthrop Labs., 514 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. 1974)
(holding that the defendant was liable where its sales materials stated that the product was not
addictive and plaintiff died from addiction to the product).
78. See, e.g., Crocker, 514 S.W.2d at 433 (holding that the defendant was liable where its
sales materials stated that the product was not addictive and plaintiff died from addiction to the
product).
79. See, e.g., Caboni v. Gen. Motors Corp., 398 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that the
defendants inaccurately portrayed the performance of an airbag in the owner's manual).
80. See, e.g., Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 338-40 (5th Cir. 1984)
(analyzing the manufacturer's failure to warn for providing inadequate operation and maintenance
instructions to prevent the boats sold from sinking); Midgley v. S.S. Kresge Co., 127 Cal. Rptr. 217,
221 (Ct. App. 1976) ("[A] product requiring assembly ... is defective if the supplier fails to warn
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1. Inaccurate Descriptions ofProducts or Product Ingredients
There are a number of cases in which consumers have sued purveyors of
canned or packaged food products, claiming that they were injured because the
product labeling was inaccurate. 8 In most instances, the plaintiffs based their
claims on breach of express warranty, 82 but plaintiffs have also relied on other
liability theories, such as strict liability and negligence.83 For example, Lane v.
C. A. Swanson & Sons 4-which was decided by a California intermediate
appellate court in 1955-involved a consumer who purchased a can of boned
chicken packaged by the defendant, C.A. Swanson & Sons. The plaintiff
brought suit when a bone fragment hidden in the contents of the can became
86lodged in his throat. Swanson argued that the phrase "boned chicken" did not
constitute an express warranty that the product was entirely free of bones or bone
fragments; rather, this phrase was merely descriptive of the manner in which the
87product was prepared and packaged. However, the court rejected this argument
partly because the defendant had explicitly stated in a newspaper advertisement
that the product had "no bones."88
Kolarik v. Cory International Corp., a more recent case, concerned a jar of
imported pimento-stuffed green olives bottled by the defendant, a wholesale
distributor. 90 The plaintiff broke a tooth when he bit down on an olive pit or pit
fragment while consuming one of the defendant's olives.91 The label on the jar
described the olives as "minced pimento stuffed."92 The plaintiff maintained that
adequately of conditions ... created by such assembly or use which would render the product
dangerous to the user.").
81. See, e.g., In re McDonald's French Fries Litig., 257 F.R.D. 669, 670 (N.D. 111. 2009)
(noting that plaintiffs diagnosed with certain medical conditions sued when McDonald's falsely
claimed that its French fries were gluten, wheat, and dairy free); Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons,
278 P.2d 723, 723-24 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (noting that plaintiff sued after receiving severe
injuries to his throat after a bone from defendant's canned chicken product lodged in plaintiffs
throat); Kolarik v. Cory Int'l Corp., 721 N.W.2d 161, 166 (Iowa 2006) (noting that plaintiff sued
defendant after fracturing his tooth on a pit found in ajar of pimiento stuffed olives).
82. See, e.g., In re McDonald's French Fries Litig., 257 F.R.D. at 670 (noting that plaintiffs
brought claim against McDonald's, alleging breach of express warranty for misrepresenting that
McDonald's fries were gluten free); Lane, 278 P.2d at 723-24 (noting that plaintiffs alleged breach
of warranty against defendant for misrepresenting that its canned chicken contained "no bones").
83. See, e.g., Kolarik, 721 N.W.2d at 161 (stating that the plaintiff relied on theories of
negligence, strict liability, and breach of express and implied warranty in bringing suit against
defendant manufacturer of minced pimento stuffed olives).
84. 278 P.2d 723.
85. Id. at 723.
86. Id. at 723-24.
87. Id. at 724.
88. Id. at 726.
89. 721 N.W.2d 159 (Iowa 2006).
90. Id. at 161.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 163.
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the language on the product's container constituted an express warranty that the
olives had been pitted and were free of pits or pit fragments.93
The plaintiff brought suit against the distributor, claiming breach of express
and implied warranty, strict liability in tort, and negligence. 9 4 The trial court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all counts. 95  On
appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's rejection of the
plaintiffs implied warranty and strict liability claims because it concluded that
the defendant, as a re-packager, was protected from liability by statute. 96 The
court also held that the description on the label did not amount to an express
warranty that the olives would not contain any pits.97
However, the appellate court reinstated the plaintiff's negligence claim.98
Applying a negligence analysis, the court declared that because the seller knew
that consumers would rely on its assurance that olive pits were removed, the
seller was required to exercise reasonable care in its processing operation to
ensure that the pits were in fact removed. 99 At the same time, the court
acknowledged that it was probably impossible for the defendant to remove all
olive pits and fragments from the product since the pitting was done by a
machine;100 therefore, the court concluded that the defendant had not been
negligent in this respect.101 However, the court concluded that, under negligence
principles, the defendant might have a duty to warn its customers that, despite its
best efforts, some pits or pit fragments might still be present in the finished
product.102 Consequently, the court remanded the case back to the lower court
for trial on the failure-to-warn issue.
103
2. Inaccurate Statements About Product Safety
Courts have also imposed liability on product sellers who make inaccurate
statements about the safety of their products. 10 4  These statements include
unwarranted assurances of product safety, misinformation about the existence or
93. Id.
94. Id. at 161.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 162 (quoting IOWA CODE § 613.18(1)(a) (2001)).
97. Id. at 164.
98. Id. at 166.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Drayton v. JifTee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081, 1093 (N.D. Ohio 1975)
(noting that the defendants advertised "that liquid-plumr was 'safe' for ordinary household use,"
before it caused severe burns to plaintiffs face), af'd, 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978); McLachlan v.
Wilmington Dry Goods Co., 22 A.2d 851, 851 (Del. Super. Ct. 1941) (noting that defendant seller
gave an affirmation of fact that the dress was suitable for wear, when it actually contained injurious
and poisonous substances).
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nature of a particular risk, understatement of the seriousness of a particular risk,
and inaccurate statements about product performance.105
a. Unwarranted Assurances ofProduct Safety
In their efforts to create a market for their products, sellers sometimes issue
blanket assurances of safety, which are based more on wishful thinking than on
their actual knowledge of the product's characteristics. 1 06 Courts are quick to
impose liability on the basis of misrepresentation or breach of express warranty
when these assurances turn out to be unwarranted. Thus, in Spiegel v. Saks 34th
Street,107 a New York intermediate appellate court upheld a claim by a consumer
who suffered severe burns and blisters after using the defendant's skin cream.los
The court concluded that the defendant expressly warranted that the product was
non-allergenic when it proclaimed that the skin cream was "hospital tested,"
"non-irritating," and "completely safe." 109
One of the best known examples of unwarranted assurances of product
safety occurred in an express warranty case, Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,110
decided more than eighty years ago. In that case, a car manufacturer provided its
dealers with sales literature incorrectly assuring potential purchasers that the
windshields of its automobiles were equipped with "shatterproof' glass. il The
plaintiff was injured by flying glass when his windshield was struck by a pebble
kicked up by a passing vehicle.112 On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court
held that Ford's description of the glass as "shatterproof' amounted to an express
warranty and that the trial court erred in refusing to admit Ford's sales literature
into evidence. 13
Another case involving unwarranted assurances of product safety is Hauter
v. Zogarts,114 in which the plaintiff was severely injured while using a product
called the "Golfing Gizmo." The device consisted of an elastic cord that was
looped around two pegs driven into the ground, a twenty-one-foot cotton cord
that was tied to the middle of the elastic cord, and a regulation-size golf ball that
105. See cases cited supra notes 72-73.
106. See, e.g., Drayton, 395 F. Supp. at 1093 (analyzing breach of warranty claims where the
defendants advertised "that liquid plumr was 'safe' for ordinary household use," before it cause
severe bums to plaintiff's face), af'd, 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978); McLachlan, 22 A.2d at 851
(noting that defendant seller gave an affirmation of fact that the dress was suitable for wear, when it
actually contained injurious and poisonous substances); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 147
N.E.2d 612, 613-14 (Ohio 1958) (discussing facts that involve a manufacturer who asserted the
product was safe and harmless, when in fact it was harmful).
107. 252 N.Y.S.2d 852, 854, 861 (App. Div. 1964).
108. Id. at 854, 861.
109. Id. at 854, 857.
110. 12 P.2d 409 (Wash. 1932).
111. Id. at 411.
112. Id. at 410.
113. Id. at 412.
114. 534 P.2d 377 (Cal. 1975).
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was attached to the other end of the cotton cord. 15 The plaintiff, a thirteen-year-
old novice golfer, apparently hit underneath the ball and caught the cord with his
golf club, thereby causing the ball to loop over the club on his backswing and hit
him in the head. 16 The plaintiff sued for misrepresentation, breach of warranty,
and strict liability in tort. 1 17 The jury found in favor of the defendant, but the
trial judge entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the
plaintiff.
The misrepresentation claim was based on section 402B of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. 119 According to the plaintiff, the label the defendant placed
on the shipping carton and the cover of the instruction booklet contained the
following assurance: "COMPLETELY SAFE BALL WILL NOT HIT
PLAYER." 120 The appellate court rejected the defendant's contention that its
statement was mere puffery and concluded instead that it was a statement of
material fact. 12 1 The court also concluded that the defendant's statement would
lead a novice golfer to reasonably assume that the Golfing Gizmo could be
safely used even if the ball was not hit properly.122 Accordingly, the court
affirmed the lower court's decision in favor of the plaintiff on the
misrepresentation claim. 123
b. Denying of the Existence of a Specified Risk
As Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories1 24 illustrates, courts may impose
liability on sellers who deny that a specified risk exists or claim that the risk is
125
minimal. In that case, the defendant became addicted to Talwin, a prescription
drug manufactured by the defendant.126 The plaintiff died while undergoing
treatment for his addiction; his widow brought suit against the drug
manufacturer, claiming that it falsely assured the medical profession that Talwin
was not addictive. 27 A statement in the Physicians' Desk Reference-circulated
to the medical profession when the drug was first introduced-contained a
115. Id. at 379.
116. Id. at 379-80.
117. Id. at 379.
118. Id. at 380.
119. Id. at 380 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965)).
120. Id. at 379.
121. Id. at 381.
122. Id. at 382-83.
123. Id. at 383.
124. 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974).
125. See id. at 433 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965)); see also
Hawkinson v. A.H. Robins Co., 595 F. Supp. 1290, 1310 (D. Colo. 1984); Palmer v. A.H. Robins
Co., 684 P.2d 187, 218 (Colo. 1984) (quoting David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products
Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1258, 1259-60 (1976)); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d
1210, 1235 (Kan. 1987).
126. Crocker, 514 S.W.2d at 429.
127. Id. at 429-30.
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heading that read "[a]bsence of addiction liability."l28 In addition, the
defendant's sales representative orally assured the plaintiffs physician that
Talwin was not addictive.129 Applying the principles of section 402B of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Texas Supreme Court declared:
Whatever the danger and state of medical knowledge, and however rare
the susceptibility of the user, when the drug company positively and
specifically represents its product to be free and safe from all dangers of
addiction, and when the treating physicians relies upon that
representation, the drug company is liable when the representation
proves to be false and harm results.o3 0
Consequently, the court reinstated the lower court's judgment for the plaintiff,
which had been overturned by an intermediate appellate court. 13 1
One of the most egregious examples of risk denial involved the
manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device (IUD). 13 2 The risk in
question arose because the string of the IUD would "wick" bacteria from the
vagina to the uterus, thereby causing pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) in users
and septic abortions in users who were already pregnant.133  Tetuan v. A.H.
Robins Co.134 is illustrative of the many cases that were brought against the
Dalkon Shield's manufacturer. 35 The plaintiff in Tetuan was forced to undergo
a complete hysterectomy after sustaining a severe pelvic infection that resulted
from using the Dalkon Shield.13 1 In 1982, the plaintiff brought suit against A.H.
Robins-the product's manufacturer-alleging negligence, civil conspiracy,
strict liability in tort, breach of warranty, fraud, and gross negligence. The
jury awarded the plaintiff $1.7 million in compensatory damages and $7.5
million in punitive damages. 138 This verdict was affirmed on appeal. 13 9
The Dalkon Corporation began manufacturing Dalkon Shields in late
1968. 14 In 1970, Dr. Hugh Davis, one of the developers of the Dalkon Shield,
published an article in the American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology in
128. Id. at 430.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 433 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965)).
131. Id.
132. See Gina Kolata, The Sad Legacy of the Dalkon Shield, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1987, at
A120, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/06/magazine/the-sad-legacy-of-the-dalkon-
shield.html.
133. Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1222 (Kan. 1987).
134. 738 P.2d 1210.
135. See C. Gavin Shepherd, Transvaginal Mesh Litigation: A New Opportunity to Resolve
Mass Medical Device Failure Claims, 80 TENN. L. REv. 477, 486 (2013).
136. Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1215-16.
137. Id. at 1215.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1246.
140. Id. at 1216.
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which he claimed that the Dalkon Shield had a pregnancy rate of 1.1% per
year.141 Later investigations, however, raised serious doubts about the
methodology of the Davis study and its conclusion about the IUD's pregnancy
rate.142 In fact, one of the defendant company's own employees informed the
company that the minimum pregnancy rate for the Dalkon Shield was no less
than 5.3%.143 Nevertheless, the company purchased the rights to the Dalkon
Shield shortly thereafter. 144
In 1971, the company began an aggressive marketing campaign to promote
the use of the Dalkon Shield. 1 The company circulated hundreds of thousands
of copies of the Davis article but failed to disclose that it was a preliminary
report, the conclusions of which had not yet been established as scientifically
valid. 14 6  In addition, the company prepared "product cards" for its sales
representatives to give to doctors. These product cards stressed the 1.1%
pregnancy rate and claimed that the IUD was safe and produced no harmful side
effects. 14 The company also distributed "[p]atient [i]nformation [s]heets,"
which claimed that IUDs-including the Dalkon Shield-were "the safest
method of effective contraception available today." 14 9  Finally, during this
period, the company placed advertisements in various newspapers and
magazines.150 However, beginning in 1972, reports of adverse reactions caused
by the Dalkon Shield-particularly PID and septic abortions-began to reach the
medical profession.1s Spokesmen for Robins denied that the Dalkon Shield was
either dangerous or ineffective, and characterized the risk from wicking as a "red
herring."' However, a number of studies concluded that the rates of PID for
the Dalkon shield were three times higher than other IUDs, and as much as
fifteen times higher for the rate for non-IUD users.153
The appellate court considered a number of issues on appeal, including the
validity of the plaintiff's fraud claim. 154 After reviewing the evidence, the court
concluded that the company was aware of "the higher pregnancy rate,
perforations, and septic abortions," but nevertheless continued to claim that the
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1216-17.
143. Id. at 1217.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 1218.
146. Id. at 1218.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1219.
151. Id. at 1219-20.
152. Id. at 1221.
153. Id. at 1223.
154. Id. at 1224.
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Dalkon Shield was "safe and effective."1ss Consequently, the court upheld the
fraud claim. 156
In Hawkinson v. A.H. Robins Co.157 -RDOther Dalkon shield case-the
plaintiffs raised a claim for misrepresentation based on section 402B of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. ss In Hawkinson, the court focused on the
defendant's "Progress Report" and concluded that it "misrepresented material
facts to the public concerning the safety and effectiveness of the Dalkon Shield
by presenting the Dalkon Shield as a totally carefree contraceptive device for all
categories of women wanting to avoid pregnancy." 159 In particular, the court
pointed out that the company had falsely claimed it did not produce "any general
effects on the body ... [and] was easily tolerated by all types of potential
users."160 Finally, the court rejected the argument that subjecting the company to
liability for misrepresentation would impose an undue burden on the
company.161 The court declared that:
[I]mposing strict liability on manufacturers who misrepresent their
products does not impose an undue burden. A manufacturer intends to
reap economic benefit from the public representations it makes
regarding the character and quality of its products, and must assume the
economic consequences for physical harm resulting from
misrepresentations it has made about its products. Manufacturers
should not benefit economically from representations they make to the
public and, at the same time, be insulated from liability for
misrepresentations which result in physical harm.162
c. Understating an Acknowledged Risk
Sometimes, a seller acknowledges that a particular risk may exist, but
underestimates the likelihood or seriousness of the risk.163 For example, the
manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield IUD provided figures representing the risk of
pregnancy associated with the use of its product that were considerably lower
than the actual risk.164 Another example of understating an acknowledged risk is
155. Id. at 1225.
156. Id. at 1229.
157. 595 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Colo. 1984).
158. Id. at 1306.
159. Id. at 1310.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1310.
162. Id. (quoting Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. Winkler, 640 P.2d 216, 220-21 (Colo. 1982)).
163. See, e.g., Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1217 (Kan. 1987) (finding that the
defendant advertised that its product carried a 1.1% risk of pregnancy, but the risk of pregnancy was
actually 5.5%).
164. Hawkinson, 595 F. Supp. at 1310; Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 195 (Colo.
1984); Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1217.
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provided by the case of Michael v. Warner/Chilcott,165 in which the seller of an
over-the-counter sinus medicine stated that prolonged use of the product in large
doses may damage the user's kidneys; according to the plaintiff, however, such
usage was almost certain to damage his kidneys. 6
On the advice of his physician, the plaintiff in Michael began using Sinutab
in 1965 to relieve sinus congestion symptoms.16 7 In 1970, he switched to the
Skaggs brand "Sinus Congestion Tablets"-the defendant's generic brand of
sinus congestion tablets-and used them until 1973.16 A "warning" on the label
of the Sinus Congestion Tablets declared that "[t]his medication may damage the
kidneys when used in large amounts or for a long period of time. Do not take
more than the recommended dosage, nor take regularly for longer than 10 days
without consulting your physician."1 69  The sinus medicine contained
phenacetin, a chemical that could potentially cause kidney failure. 17 0 After
taking the sinus medicine for three years, the plaintiff developed symptoms of
kidney failure and stopped taking the drug.171
The plaintiff brought negligence and strict liability claims against the drug
manufacturers, arguing that, inter alia, they failed to adequately warn about the
risk of kidney failure resulting from long-term consumption of their products. 172
When the trial court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
negligence claim, the defendants appealed. 17 3 On appeal, the New Mexico Court
of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling, declaring that it could not determine,
as a matter of law, that the warning was adequate.174 According to the court,
"[t]he 'warning' given by defendants states that 'This medication may damage
the kidneys.' It does not apprise the consumer of the fact that it will damage the
kidneys."75 This language, along with other shortcomings, presented a jury
question regarding whether the warning was sufficient to inform the plaintiff
about the true risk of taking the defendant's sinus medicine on a long-term
basis.
165. 579 P.2d 183 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).
166. Id. at 185, 187.
167. Id. at 184.
168. Id. at 184-85.
169. Id. at 184.
170. Id. at 185.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 186.
175. Id. at 187.
176. See id.
2013] 151
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEW
d. Providing Inaccurate Information About a Specified Risk
Sellers may also be subject to liability for providing inaccurate information
about the nature of a specified risk, as illustrated by In re M/V DG
Harmony.178 In that case, the owner of a container ship brought suit against the
manufacturer of calcium hypochlorite hydrated chemicals, a large quantity of
which caught fire and destroyed the ship and most of its cargo. 17  The ship
owner based its claim on strict liability, breach of warranty, negligence, and
failure to warn.180
Calcium hypochlorite hydrated (cal-hypo) is a bactericide used to purify
water.181 The cal-hypo in question was manufactured by PPG Industries, Inc.
and packaged in 136-kilogram cardboard fiber drums, with metal rings at the top
and bottom. 182  Approximately 120 drums were packed in each of the ten
containers on the ship for its voyage from Newport News, Virginia to Rio de
Janiero and other ports in Brazil. It appears that the cal-hypo was first placed
into 136-kilogram drums at the PPG plant while still hot, then subsequently
shrink-wrapped onto wooden pallets and "tightly packed three-high into
unrefrigerated, unventilated metal containers." 184 The temperature in the ship's
hold ranged from approximately 95 0 F to 104oF.18 5 The fire started when the cal-
hypo in one-or possibly two-of the containers decomposed and self-heated,
causing a "thermal runaway," which in turn led to an explosion and a fire.18 6
After finding PPG strictly liable under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act for
causing goods of an inflammable, explosive, or dangerous nature to be placed on
the container ship without informing the ship's owners and crew of the true
character of the cal-hypo material, the court turned to the failure-to-warn
issue. According to the court, "The warnings provided by PPG were
inadequate and misleading."' 8 8 In particular, the court found that the Material
Safety Data Sheet PPG provided to the ship's personnel stated that cal-hypo
177. See, e.g., In re MN DG Harmony, 394 F. Supp. 2d 649, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting
Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 339 (5th Cir. 1984)), amended by 98 CIV.
8394 (DC), 2007 WL 895251 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2007), aJ'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part,
518 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2008), opinion amended and superseded, 533 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2008), aff'd,
408 F. App'x 435 (2d Cir. 2011).
178. 394 F. Supp. 2d 649.
179. Id. at 651.
180. Id. at 652.
181. Id. at 651.
182. Id. at 659.
183. Id. at 654, 659-60.
184. Id. at 669.
185. Id. at 661.
186. Id. at 651-52.
187. Id. at 672 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012)).
188. Id. at 674.
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decomposed at 3560F and became unstable above 253oF.189 In fact, cal-hypo
could decompose or become unstable at lower temperatures, especially when
packed tightly in metal containers and stored in the hold of a ship.19 0
Accordingly, the court concluded that PPG negligently failed to provide an
adequate warning.191
e. Proving Inaccurate Information About Product Performance
Caboni v. General Motors Corp.192 illustrates the nature of a claim based on
providing inaccurate-and overly optimistic-information about a product's
performance, particularly as it relates to safety.193 In Caboni, the plaintiff was
injured when, after smashing into a guardrail, the airbag in his General Motors
Corporation (GM) pickup truck failed to open. 194 The plaintiff brought suit
against the truck manufacturer under the Louisiana Products Liability Act
(LPLA), alleging that the airbag was unreasonably dangerous because it failed to
conform to an express warranty set forth in the owner's manual.1 95 At trial, the
jury found in favor of the plaintiff, and GM subsequently appealed. 196
The owner's manual declared that the airbag was designed to inflate in
"moderate to severe front or near-frontal crashes." 197 It also stated that the
airbag would not deploy below a certain threshold level, which varied from
thirteen to eighteen miles per hour.i1s The Fifth Circuit rejected GM's claim that
the statement in the owner's manual was not an express warranty, but rather, a
general description of the vehicle's safety features.19 The court also disagreed
with GM's contention that the truck did not go straight into the guardrail and was
not traveling at a high enough speed to reach the "threshold level."200 The court
determined this was a jury issue and that the jury had accepted the plaintiff's
version of the facts.2 0 1 However, although GM breached an express warranty
concerning the performance of the truck's airbag, the court was forced to vacate
189 Id. at 660. The court of appeals ultimately affirmed the district court's finding that PPG
negligently failed to provide an adequate warning. In re M/V DG Harmony, 408 F. App'x 435, 437
(2d Cir. 2011).
190. In re MN DG Harmony, 394 F. Supp. 2d 649, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
191. Id. at 675.
192. 398 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2005).
193. See id.
194. Id. at 358.
195. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.51-.60 (2009)).
196. Id. at 359.
197. Id. at 358-59 n.1 (quoting GEN. MOTORS CORP., THE 1996 CHEVROLET S-SERIES
OWNER'S MANUAL 1-20 (1995)).
198. Id. (citing GENERAL MOTORS CORP, supra note 197, at 1-20)).
199. Id. at 360.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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the lower court's judgment because the plaintiff failed to prove that his injuries
were caused or enhanced by the failure of the airbag to inflate. 202
3. Instructions on Assembly, Operation, and Maintenance
Courts have also imposed liability for providing inaccurate instructions
relating to the assembly, operation, and maintenance of a product.2 03
a. Inaccurate Information About Assembly
It is surprising that few reported cases involving instructions for assembly
exist, particularly given how bad such instructions often can be.2 04 Midgley V. S.
S. Kresge Co.20 provides an interesting example.206 In that case, although the
information in the instructions for assembly was incomplete-rather than
inaccurate-the instructions, coupled with the product's design, created a false
impression of safety for the product user.20 7 The product involved in Midgley
was a refracting telescope manufactured in Japan for the defendant, S.S. Kresge
Company. 208 The plaintiff was a thirteen-year-old boy. 20 9
The telescope was sold disassembled and was accompanied by a booklet of
instructions on assembly, use, and maintenance.210 The telescope's components
included a sun filter that consisted of a dark lens labeled "Sun."2' The
instructions declared that "[s]un and moon glasses are deposited in the eyepieces
cases; screwed into the eyepiece bottom. Be sure to use sun glass for solar
observation and moon glass for moon observation." 2 12 The telescope's eyepiece
consisted of a hollow cylinder-threaded at each end-that was about an inch in
213length. When properly assembled for viewing the sun, the clear glass lens
202. See id. at 360-63.
203. See, e.g., Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 339 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding manufacturer strictly liable for failure to warn because owner's manual failed to
completely disclose the existence and extent of risks involved with operations of a boat); Midgley v.
S.S. Kresge Co., 127 Cal. Rptr. 217, 221 (Ct. App. 1976) (holding supplier "strictly liable for injury
proximately resulting from composing and furnishing a set of instructions for assembly and use
which does not adequately avoid the danger of injury").
204. See Lisa L. Locke, Note, Products Liability and Home-Exercise Equipment: A Failure to
Warn and Instruct May Be Hazardous to Your Health, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 779, 800 (1988)
("Some consumer group tests and ratings of fitness equipment indicate that difficult or 'impossible'
assembly of some of the devices is a common and potentially hazardous problem.").
205. 127 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1976).
206. Id. at 221 (noting that the product was technically complex, thus the manufacturer should
have known that the instructions provided for assembly, if not clear, would present a risk of injury).
207. See id. at 218-19.
208. Id. at 218.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 219.
213. Id.
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would screw into one end of the eyepiece and the sun filter would screw into the
other end. 14 Unfortunately, the plaintiff suffered eye damage while viewing the
sun because he removed the eyepiece lens and replaced it with the sun filter,
instead of using both of them at the same time. 2 15
The plaintiff sued Kresge for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict
liability, although only the strict liability claim was submitted to the jury. 216The
trial court refused to instruct the jury on failure-to-warn as an aspect of the strict
liability claim. 2 17 After a jury verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed.2 18
Reversing the trial court, the appellate court declared that because the defendant
had "marketed a technically complex product intended for use by technically
unsophisticated consumers," it had a duty to warn about the dangers of improper
assembly.219 Consequently, the court concluded that "the supplier [w]as strictly
liable for injury proximately resulting from composing and furnishing a set of
instructions for assembly and use which [did] not adequately avoid the danger of
- ,,220injury.
b. Inaccurate Instructions About Operation and Maintenance
Many products are inherently dangerous, and consumers must rely on
manufacturers and other sellers to instruct them how to properly operate and
maintain these products.221 Unfortunately, manufacturers do not always provide
adequate instructions, and such inadequate warnings have created a fertile source
222for litigation. In most of these cases, plaintiffs allege that the manufacturer
has failed to provide a vital piece of information; sometimes, however, plaintiffs
claim that the information provided is affirmatively wrong. Pavlides v.
Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc.223 is illustrative of this fact pattern. In Pavlides, the
estates of a group of fishermen sued the manufacturer of a Robalo 236 motorboat
that sank in the Gulf of Mexico.224 Four of the fishermen drowned in the
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 218.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. Id. at 221.
220. Id.
221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i (1998) ("In addition
to alerting users and consumers to the existence and nature of product risks so that they can, by
appropriate conduct during use or consumption, reduce the risk of harm, warnings also may be
needed to inform users and consumers of nonobvious and not generally known risks that
unavoidably inhere in using or consuming the product.").
222. See, e.g., Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding
manufacturer liable on failure to warn claim for failing to provide adequate instructions about
avoiding the risks involved with use of the product).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 333 & n.1.
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accident-leaving only one survivor 225-after the boat's bilge drain plug
apparently came out, causing the boat to take on water and eventually sink.
Most Robalo boats were "fully-foamed," meaning that all of the void spaces
in the hull were filled with foam flotation material to prevent any void bilge
spaces. 2 27 However, the particular boat in question-the R-236-was not fully
foamed, but instead had a large void space in the bilge with a through-hull bilge
drain in the rear of the bilge below the waterline.228 Water that entered the bilge
area could only be removed by means of the bilge pump.229 However, "[t]he R-
236 was not equipped with an automatic bilge pump"-which would begin to
operate "when water reached a certain level in the bilge"-nor did it have an
alarm that would warn the boat's "occupants of the presence of water in the
bilge." 230 Furthermore, once the bilge filled with water, the bilge pump would
stop operating if the batteries were flooded.231
The sales literature furnished by the boat's manufacturer claimed that the R-
236 was "'85 percent closed-cell foam,' suggesting [incorrectly] that the boat
[was] foamed to 85 percent of capacity with closed-cell foam." The owner's
manual-which was designed for the entire Robalo product line-did not
divulge the fact that the R-236, unlike other Robalo boats, "ha[d] a void bilge
space, a bilge drain and a bilge drain plug," nor did it inform operators what to
do if the bilge pump failed. The manual's sole piece of advice on this issue
was "[i]f water in the boat appears excessive, open the upper drain plugs." 234
The trial court ruled that the boat's design and manufacture were not
defective and also concluded that the warnings and operating instructions were
adequate. 2 35  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on the
manufacturing and design defect claims, but reversed its ruling on the failure-to-
warn claim.2 6  The court declared that an adequate warning required "a
complete disclosure of the existence and extent of the risk involved."2 7 In this
case, the owner's manual failed to inform the plaintiffs that the accidental
removal of the bilge drain plug would lead to a catastrophic sequence of events
that, if not immediately corrected, would cause the boat to sink.238
Consequently, the manufacturer should have foreseen that this series of events
225. Id. at 333.
226. Id. at 336-37.
227. Id. at 334.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 334-35.
231. Id. at 335.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 335-36.
234. Id. at 336.
235. Id. at 337.
236. Id. at 338, 341.
237. Id. at 338 (quoting Ahnan Bros. Farms & Feed Mill, Inc. v. Diamond Labs., Inc., 437
F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir. 1971)).
238. Id. at 339.
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might occur, and should have provided warnings and instructions that may have
enabled the plaintiffs to prevent the boat from sinking.239
C. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion leads to the following conclusions. First, product
sellers have a duty to provide adequate warnings and instructions to ensure that
consumers can use their products safely.240 Although breach of this duty is
commonly referred to as "failure-to-warn," liability is not limited to failure to
provide information, but also may be based on providing inaccurate or
misleading information.241 Second, these factual misstatements can appear in a
variety of forms, including product labels and packaging, brochures and other
sales literature, owner's manuals, sales contracts, instructional or promotional
videos, service bulletins, and certain specialized materials such as MSDS and
PDR entries.
Third, the duty to provide accurate information in connection with the sale
of a product can be based on negligence, breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability, or strict liability in tort.242 In addition, a product seller is liable
for misrepresentation or breach of express warranty for any inaccurate
descriptions or false statements about a product's quality or performance
characteristics.243 Finally, no court has expressed concern about the possible
''chilling effect" that this imposition of liability might have on the commercial
speech-or other First Amendment rights-of product sellers.
III. PRINTED MATERIALS
There have been cases involving inaccurate information contained in various
forms of media, such as textbooks, encyclopedias, cookbooks, instructional
publications, travel guides, diet books, self-improvement books, advertisements,
maps and charts, medical forms, and published standards by trade
24
associations.244 Unlike their treatment of cases involving inaccurate information
239. Id.
240. Id. at 338 (citing Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir.
1973)) ("It is a fundamental principle of the law of product liability ... that a manufacturer has a
responsibility to instruct consumers as to the safe use of its product and to warn consumers of
dangers associated with its product. . . .").
241. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i (1998)
(discussing liability of manufacturers and sellers for defects due to inadequate warnings containing
inaccurate or false information); see also 2 OWEN ET AL., supra note 3, § 20:9, at 480-81 (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19 cint. d (1998)).
242. See 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.5, at 15.
243. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
244. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) (involving an
encyclopedia); Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975) (involving a radio
advertisement); Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Ct. App. 1985) (involving an
aeronautical chart); Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (involving a
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provided in connection with the sale of a product, courts almost always have
refused to impose strict liability on the publishers of freestanding written
materials not connected with a separate product. 24 5
A. Textbooks
A small number of courts have refused to impose liability on textbook
publishers.246 For example, in Walter v. Bauer,247 the plaintiff suffered an injury
to his eye while engaged in a science experiment that involved a ruler and rubber
bands.24 8 The instructions for the experiment were provided in a fourth-grade
textbook-Discovering Science 4-published by the defendant, Charles E.
Merill Publishing Company.249 The plaintiff brought a strict liability claim
against the publisher, arguing that "the experiment contained in the textbook was
inherently defective because it contained an unreasonable risk or [sic] harm by
placing dangerous instrumentalities of rubber bands and ruler in the hands of
fourth grade students."' 50 The plaintiff also claimed that the textbook was
defective because it failed to warn about the risks associated with that
experiment.251
However, the court rejected what it called the plaintiffs "novel theory"
because it concluded that the plaintiffs injury was not caused by the book's
intended use-to be read-but rather, by a ruler and rubber bands that were
provided by the school, not the defendant publisher.252 The court also expressed
concern that extending strict liability to book publishers would have a chilling
effect on the dissemination of information and ideas.253 The Walter case
cookbook); Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publ'ns, Inc., 833 P.2d 70 (Haw. 1992) (involving a
travel guide); Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1264 (111. App. Ct. 1985)
(involving an instructional book); MacKown v. Ill. Publ'g & Printing Co., 6 N.E.2d 526 (111. App.
Ct. 1937) (involving an article in a newspaper); Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1974) (involving an advertisement in a magazine); Young v. Mallet, 371 N.Y.S.2d 1
(App. Div. 1975) (involving a self-help book on vitamins); Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821
(Sup. Ct. 1981) (involving a textbook), modified, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 1982); Smith v.
Linn, 563 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), af'd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991) (involving diet book).
245. See, e.g., Winter, 938 F.2d at 1036 (declining to impose strict liability on an encyclopedia
publisher); Cardozo, 342 So. 2d at 1057 (declining to impose strict liability on publisher of a
cookbook); Birmingham, 833 P.2d at 79 (declining to impose strict liability on the publisher of a
travel guide).
246. See, e.g., Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1218 (D. Md. 1988) (holding
that a textbook publisher should not be held "strictly liable as publisher for the content of the books
that it publishes"); Walter, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 822 (concluding that strict liability should not apply
where an experiment described in a textbook caused injury to a student's eye).
247. 439 N.Y.S.2d 821.
248. Id. at 822.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. Id. at 823.
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provides an early example of the tangibility rationale. In the court's view, strict
liability was most appropriate when it was confined to injuries directly caused by
the physical or tangible aspects of a product.254 In contrast, the imposition of
strict liability on sellers for injuries caused by intangible aspects-such as the
information contained in printed textbooks-was much more problematic. 2 55
Jones v. JB. Lippincott Co.256 also involved an allegedly defective
257textbook. In that case, a constipated nursing student sustained injuries when
she treated herself to a hydrogen peroxide enema in accordance with the
instructions set forth in the Textbook for Medical and Surgical Nursing. 258The
nursing student brought a negligence action against one of the authors of the
book, as well as negligence and strict products liability actions against the
book's publisher, J.B. Lippincott Company.259 Lippincott moved to dismiss the
complaint or for summary judgment, claiming that it was not responsible for the
contents of the book.260
In granting the defendant's summary judgment motion, the court
distinguished between author liability and publisher liability for inaccurate
information.261 While acknowledging that the law was not settled, the court
conceded that an author might be liable for in uries to readers caused by errors in
the content of books, designs, and drawings. However, the court declared that
one who merely publishes something written by another owed no duty to the
reader to check the contents for accuracy. 3 Finding that Lippincott's
involvement in the normal process of editing did not make it an author, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs negligence claim must fail.264
Addressing the plaintiffs contention that Lippincott should be subject to
strict liability under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
court observed that strict liability for factual errors was currently restricted to the
narrow area of maps and charts.26 5 The court seemed to think that maps and
charts were more like tools than books, whose principal function was to
disseminate information and ideas.266 Finally, the court expressed concern that
imposing tort liability on book publishers would chill free expression.267 For
these reasons, the court granted Lippincott's motion for summary judgment.2 68
254. See id. at 822-23.
255. See id.
256. 694 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 1988).
257. Id. at 1216.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1216-17.
262. Id. at 1216.
263. Id. at 1216-17.
264. See id. at 1217.
265. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1218.
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B. Treatises and Encyclopedias
Several cases have considered whether publishers of treatises or
encyclopedias should be held liable for factual errors that cause injury to their
readers. 69 One of the most influential cases involving the liability of book
publishers is Winter v. G.P. Putnam 's Sons.2 70 In that case, two mushroom
collectors-relying on information and descriptions contained in a book
published by the defendant, G.P. Putnam's Sons-ate some mushrooms that
turned out to be highly poisonous.271 The book in question, The Encyclopedia of
Mushrooms, was a reference work on the collection and preparation of
mushrooms. 27 2 Although the book was originally published in Great Britain, the
defendant purchased copies of the book and distributed them without alteration
in the United States. 273
Alleging that the encyclopedia contained erroneous and misleading
information about the mushrooms they consumed, the plaintiffs sued Putnam on
the basis of strict products liability, breach of warranty, negligence, and
negligent misrepresentation.274 In response, Putnam moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the products liability claim could not be maintained
because the information contained in the book was not a product. 27 5 Putnam also
contended that the other claims were invalid because it had no duty to check the
accuracy of the contents of the books it published.276
Turning to the products liability claim, the court observed that products
liability law-at least as it was embodied in Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts-was exclusively concerned with items of a tangible nature. 27 7
The court also noted that all of the examples of products listed in comment d that
were subject to strict liability in tort were tangible in nature.2 7 8 Moreover,
according to the Winter court, strict products liability was principally concerned
with forcing the sellers of manufactured products to bear the cost of injuries
inflicted on those who used their products. 79 To achieve this objective, it was
not necessary to also impose strict liability on book publishers.280 Furthermore,
269. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing
whether the publishers of an encyclopedia should be held liable for the damages a reader incurred
from relying on information in the encyclopedia).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1033.
272. Id. at 1034.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
278. Id. at 1034 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. d (1965)).
279. Id. at 1034-35 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 98, at 692-93) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. a (1965)).
280. See id. at 1035, 1036.
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subjecting publishers to strict liability "could seriously inhibit those who wish to
share thoughts and theories.281
The plaintiffs responded to this chilling effect concern by urging the court to
limit the scope of strict liability to books that give instructions on performing
some form of activity that is inherently dangerous.282 However, the court felt
that any distinction between instructional materials and the expression of abstract
ideas was illusory.283 The court also rejected the argument that "how-to"
books-a category which the plaintiffs believed would include the Encyclopedia
of Mushrooms-were similar to aeronautical charts, which some courts had
characterized as products.284 Instead, the court likened a chart to a compass, in
the sense that both are tools that "may be used to guide an individual who is
engaged in an activity requiring certain knowledge of natural features."285 In
contrast, the court thought that books like the Encyclopedia ofMushrooms more
closely resembled a primer on how to use a compass or a chart. 2 86 Thus, the
court concluded a chart was "like a physical 'product' while [a] 'How To Use'
book [was] pure thought and expression." 28 7
The court also disagreed with the plaintiffs claim that California courts
would not distinguish between physical products and intangible ideas.2 8 8
Responding to the trial court's contention that strict liability was only applicable
to items whose physical properties caused them to be innately dangerous, the
court in Fluor observed that, while a sheet of paper might not be dangerous in
itself, a paper designed to aid aircraft navigation would create a danger to aircraft
whose pilots relied on it if it failed to identify a mountain located near a landing
site. 2 89 The Winter court, however, concluded the Fluor court simply meant that
strict liability principles do not require that an injury necessarily be caused by
the physical properties of the product.290 The court declared that "the injury does
not have to result because a compass explodes in your hand, but can result
because the compass malfunctions and leads you over a cliff."2 9 1 In the court's
view, imposing liability in the case of a malfunctioning compass was quite
different from imposing liability for "such things as ideas which have no
physical properties at all."292 Consequently, the court refused to hold Putnam
281. Id. at 1035.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1035-36.
285. Id. at 1036.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1036 & n.4 (citing Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 71-72 (Ct.
App. 1985)).
289. Id. at 1036 n.4 (quoting Fluor Corp., 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71-72).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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liable under the law of strict products liability for injuries that were allegedly
caused by the ideas and statements in its books. 2 9 3
The court then turned its attention to the plaintiffs negligence claim, which
was based on Putnam's failure to verify the accuracy of the Encyclopedia of
Mushrooms' contents or to warn readers that they should not rely on any factual
statements in the book.294 The court's analysis began with a statement that "[i]n
order for negligence to be actionable," the plaintiff must show that the defendant
had "a legal duty to exercise due care" on his or her behalf.2 9 5 The court
acknowledged that a publisher may assume a duty to investigate, but in the
absence of an assumption, there was nothing in the normal process of publishing
a book that would support the imposition of such a duty on publishers. 2 96 The
plaintiffs argued that the holding in Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. provided
support for the imposition of a duty of care on the media.2 97 However, the court
pointed out that in Weirum, the defendant radio station actively promoted a
"competitive scramble" and encouraged teenage members of its audience to race
from point to point in search of clues. 2 The Weirum court upheld a jury verdict
against the radio station for contributing to a fatal automobile accident caused by
one of the scramble contestants. However, the court declared that there was
no connection between the radio station's role in Weirum and the publisher's role
in Winter, which merely consisted of disseminating ideas and information to the
public. 300 Accordingly, the court ruled that Putnam had no duty to independently
determine whether the contents of the encyclopedia were accurate.301
Finally, the court concluded that Putnam did not have to inform its
customers that the information in the encyclopedia was not necessarily complete
and that customers should not rely on it.302 Nor was Putnam required to warn
that it had not investigated the text and, therefore, could not guarantee its
accuracy.303 According to the court, to require the publisher to satisfy the first
requirement would force it "to do exactly what we have said he has no duty to
do-that is, independently investigate the accuracy of the text."3 04 The court
determined that the second requirement was unnecessary since no publisher had
293. Id. at 1036.
294. Id. at 1037. The court rejected the plaintiffs claims of misrepresentation and negligent
misrepresentation because it found that the defendant had not guaranteed the accuracy of the
author's work. Id. at 1036.
295. Id. at 1037 (citing 6 BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 732 (9th
ed. 1988)).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1037 n.8 (citing Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975)).
298. Id. (citing Weirum, 539 P.2d at 41).
299. Id. (citing Weirum, 539 P.2d at 37, 42).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1037.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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a duty to act as a guarantor. 30 5 For these reasons, the court in Winter affirmed
the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the publisher.306
C. Travel Guides
The leading case on the issue of liability for publishing inaccurate
information in travel guides is Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publications,
Inc.3 07 One of the plaintiffs in that case was injured while body surfing in the
ocean waters of Kekaha Beach on the Hawaiian island of Kauai. The plaintiff
claimed to have relied on language in the defendant's publication, Fodor 's
Hawaii 1988, which described the Kekaha Beach Park as "a long, luxurious strip
of sand recalling the beaches of California," but failed to mention the existence
of dangerous wave and water conditions offshore.3 09 The plaintiff brought a
negligent misrepresentation action against Fodor's Travel Publications, Inc. for
failing to warn about these dangerous conditions in its travel guide.310 The trial
court granted Fodor's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff
appealed. 311 On appeal, the plaintiff-for the first time-attempted to make a
claim based on strict products liability.3 12
The court first discussed the negligence claim, concluding that Fodor's had
no duty to investigate surf conditions at Kekaha Beach, nor to warn about them,
unless it authored or guaranteed the accuracy of the information in its book.13
The court also refused to impose a duty to investigate or warn under the
provisions of the Restatement's version of negligent misrepresentation.314
Finally, the court reasoned that the imposition of such a duty would have an
undesirable chilling effect on the publication of ideas and information.315
The court then addressed the plaintiff s strict products liability claim.316 The
plaintiff argued that Fodor's uidebook was a product and that the publisher was
strictly liable for his injuries. 7 In support of this argument, the plaintiff cited a
305. Id. at 1038.
306. Id
307. 833 P.2d 70 (Haw. 1992).
308. Id. at 73. Gail Birmingham, the wife of the injured party, was also a party to the lawsuit.
Id.
309. Id. at 73 & n.1.
310. Id. at 73.
311. Id. at 74.
312. Id. at 77.
313. Id. at 76-77.
314. Id. at 75 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965)).
315. Id. at 75-76 (quoting Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (111.
App. Ct. 1985)).
316. Id. at 77-79 (citing Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034-46 (9th Cir.
1991); Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 1985); Saloomey v. Jeppesen
& Co., 707 F.2d 671, 673, 677 (2d Cir. 1983); Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 70
n.1 (Ct. App. 1985); Bidar v. Amfac, Inc., 669 P.2d 154, 160-61 (Haw. 1983)).
317. Id. at 77.
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number of cases involving aeronautical charts.318 According to the plaintiff, the
courts in these cases concluded that aeronautical approach charts should be
treated as products because they could be extremely dangerous for their intended
use if they were inaccurate. 3 19 In addition, it was appropriate for the publisher to
bear the costs of injuries when the charts were defective because they were mass-
produced and mass-marketed.32 0
In response, the court in Birmingham pointed out that the errors in the chart
cases were caused by the publisher, not the original source of the information.321
Furthermore, echoing the court's reasoning in Winter, the court stated that
aeronautical charts were technical tools-and therefore like a physical product-
while the information in a travel guide resembled pure thought or expression.322
Finally, the court invoked the chilling effect rationale, declaring that "[t]he threat
of liability without fault (financial responsibility for our words and ideas in the
absence of fault or a special undertaking or responsibility) could seriously inhibit
those who wish to share thoughts and theories." 323 Accordingly, the court held
that the plaintiff could not recover against Foder's for his injures based on a
theory of strict products liability.32 4
D. Cookbooks
So far, only one reported case, Cardozo v. True,3 25 has involved a cookbook.
In that case, the plaintiff innocently nibbled on a slice of Dasheen plant-
otherwise known as "elephant's ears"-while preparing a recipe from a book
titled Trade Winds Cookery.32 6 Unfortunately, the plaintiff did not realize that
the Dasheen plant was poisonous in its raw state. 32 The plaintiff sued Ellie's
Book and Stationery, Inc., the retail seller of the book, for breach of implied
warranty. 3 28  The trial court certified to the intermediate appellate court the
question of whether a retail book seller was liable for breach of warranty to the
purchaser for injuries caused by improper instructions or inadequate warnings
with respect to poisonous ingredients called for in a recipe. 32 9
318. Id. (citing Brocklesby, 767 F.2d 1288; Saloomey, 707 F.2d 671; Fluor Corp., 216 Cal.
Rptr. 68).
319. Id. (citing Brocklesby, 767 F.2d at 1295).
320. Id. (quoting Saloomey, 707 F.2d at 677).
321. Id. at 78 & n.9 (citing Brocklesby, 767 F.2d at 1292; Saloomey, 707 F.2d at 677; Fluor,
216 Cal. Rptr. at 72).
322. Id. at 78 (quoting Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991)).
323. Id. at 79 (quoting Winter, 938 F.2d at 1035).
324. Id.
325. 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
326. Id. at 1054.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1055. The plaintiff also sued the author, Norma True, but she was not a party to the
proceeding. Id. at 1054.
329. Id.
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The defendant, Ellie's, argued that any implied warranty that may have
arisen in connection with the sale of the Trade Winds cookbook was limited to
its physical characteristics and did not extend to the author's thought
processes. 33 0 The defendant also claimed that imposing liability on booksellers
would infringe upon freedom of speech and expression. 3 The court
acknowledged that the UCC's definition of goods was broad enough to
include books and that Ellie's qualified as a merchant with respect to books.333
Consequently, the court declared that the issue was not whether Ellie's had given
a warranty, but what the scope of that warranty was.334 In the court's view,
Ellie's clearly warranted the tangible properties of its books, but the bookseller
did not necessarily warrant the intangible thoughts and ideas conveyed by
them.335 According to the court, it was "unthinkable that standards imposed on
the quality of goods sold by a merchant would require that merchant-who is a
book seller-to evaluate the thought processes of the many authors and
publishers of the hundred, and often thousands, of books the merchant offers for
sale. ,336
The court identified several principles that limited the liability of publishers
to readers and others.337 One such principle was the rule that publishers were not
generally liable for injuries to consumers from products advertised in
newspapers or magazines. Another principle protected distributors of
newspapers and magazines from liability for defamation when they could not
reasonably know that a particular publication contained defamatory material.
Finally, the court observed that, under Florida law, newspapers were not
ordinarily liable for reprinting material from other news publications. 34 0
According to the court, these protective rules reflected the fact that "ideas hold a
privileged position in our society." 3 4 1
The court went on to declare that ideas-and presumably factual information
as well-are not commercial products and, therefore, those who disseminate
ideas should not be subject to liability under the UCC.342 To impose liability on
booksellers and others who disseminate information, regardless of fault, "would
severely restrict the flow of the ideas."343 In light of this, the court concluded
330. Id. at 1055.
331. Id.
332. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 672.105 (2004)).
333. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 672.105 (2004)).
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1057.
336. Id. at 1056.
337. Id.
338. Id. (citing MacKown v. Ill. Publ'g & Printing Co., 6 N.E.2d 526 (111. App. Ct. 1937);
Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974)).
3 3 9. Id.
340. Id. (citing Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234 (Fla. 1933)).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1056-57.
343. Id. at 1057.
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that the drafters of the UCC did not intend for its warranty provisions to extend
to the content of books and other published material.344
E. Instructional Publications
Instructional or how-to publications instruct their readers how to perform a
particular task or operation. Obviously, these publications can cause harm if
their instructions are unclear, incomplete, or incorrect.346 Alm v. Van Nostrand
Reinhold Co., Inc.347 provides an interesting example of this.348 In that case, the
plaintiff claimed that he was injured while making a woodworking tool
according to instructions provided in a book titled The Making of Tools,
published by the defendant. 4 The plaintiff brought suit against the publisher on
a theory of negligent misrepresentation, contending that the publisher should
have independently verified the accuracy of the book's contents. 3 50 In support of
this claim, the plaintiff relied on section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which he contended imposed a duty on publishers to provide safe and
adequate instructions.351
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument and refused to impose a duty on
publishers to verify the accuracy of the materials they disseminate. 35 2 The court
warned that the "[p]laintiff s theory, if adopted, would place upon publishers the
duty of scrutinizing and even testing all procedures contained in any of their
publications."353  Furthermore, the potential liability under such a rule would
"extend to an undeterminable number of potential [victims]." 3 54  The court
observed that a number of other courts had cited First Amendment concerns as a
reason for refusing to impose a duty to investigate on publishers.35 5 Thus, the
court in Alm affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim.35 6
A federal district court reached a similar conclusion in Lewin v.
McCreight.357 In Lewin, an explosion occurred while the plaintiff was mixing a
344. Id.
345. See, e.g., Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1264 (fll. App. Ct. 1985)
(noting that a how-to book explains how to accomplish a task).
346. See, e.g., id. (discussing that a plaintiff was injured after trying to make a tool based on
the instructions in a how-to book).
347. 480 N.E.2d 1263.
348. See id. at 1264.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 1264-65 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 311 (1965)).
351. Id. at 1265 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965)).
352. Id. at 1267 (citing MacKown v. Ill. Publ'g & Printing Co., 6 N.E.2d 526, 530 (111. App.
Ct. 1937)).
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. (citing Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990, 993-94 (E.D.N.Y.
1977); Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
3 5 6. Id.
357. 655 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
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mordant in accordance with directions set forth in a book titled The Complete
Metalsmith.358 The injured plaintiff brought a statutory products liability claim
against the author and the publisher of the book.359 The plaintiff asserted that the
publisher failed to warn that the book might contain "defective ideas."360 In
response, the book publisher moved to dismiss the claim against it.36 1 The court
viewed the issue as one of duty: did the publisher have a duty to warn potential
readers about the accuracy of the book's content?3 62 The court acknowledged
that a publisher might have a duty to warn when it actually created the
information contained in the book's contents. 36 3  However, relying on the
reasoning of the Alm decision, the court declined to extend that duty to
publishers when a book's content was generated by a third-party author. 36 4 The
court also agreed with the court in Alm that imposing such a duty on publishers
would subject them to potentially unlimited liability, thereby impairing society's
access to ideas.365 Consequently, the court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss.366
F. Diet and Self-Improvement Books
There are several reported cases involving lawsuits against the publishers of
diet books.367 For example, in Smith v. Linn, 8 the decedent died of cardiac
failure allegedly caused by a liquid protein diet promoted in a book titled When
Everything Else Fails . .. The Last Chance Diet.369 The administrator of the
decedent's estate brought suit against the publisher of the diet book based on
several theories of liability.3 70 The lower court granted summary judgment in
favor of the publisher, concluding that it was protected from civil liability by the
First Amendment.371
358. Id. at 282.
359. Id. at 282-83 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2945 (2010)).
360. Id. at 283.
361. Id. at 282.
362. Id. at 283.
363. Id. (citing Cent. Soya Co. v. Rose, 352 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)).
364. Id. at 283-84 (citing Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (111.
App. Ct. 1985)).
365. Id. at 284.
366. See id.
367. See, e.g., Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(involving injuries allegedly sustained from proscribing to a low-carbohydrate diet); Smith v. Linn,
563 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), affid, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991) (involving the death of a dieter,
allegedly resulting from complying with a liquid protein diet).
368. 563 A.2d 123.
369. Id. at 124-25.
370. See id.
371. Id. at 125.
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The plaintiff's first claim was based on a theory of "negligent
publication." 37 2 According to the plaintiff, liability for physical harm caused by
negligent publication was supported by the reasoning in Incollingo v. Ewing and
Robb v. Gylock Corp., as well as several sections of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.373 The plaintiff also relied on Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., New York Times v. Sullivan, and
Schenck v. United States to support his contention that the First Amendment did
not protect certain kinds of harmful expression from civil liability.374
Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania court concluded that none of the exceptions
identified in these decisions were applicable to the facts of the instant case.
The court in Smith also rejected the argument that various provisions of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts supported the imposition of liability on
publishers. 3 76  For example, the court declared that sections 310, 311 and
557A-dealing with conscious misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation,
and fraudulent misrepresentation, respectively-were not applicable to
publishers. 3 77 Furthermore, the court declined to extend the provisions of section
388 to book publishers. 378 According to the court, section 388-which required
sellers of dangerous products to supply their customers with adequate warnings
and instructions for safe use-was not applicable to publishers because warnings
and instructions are not equivalent to published materials that espouse theories,
opinions, or ideologies.3 79
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs contention that the defendant's diet
book was a product subject to liability under section 402A. 380 Citing Herceg v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. and Cardozo v. True, the court observed that a number of
courts refused to hold that a publication was a product and that no court had
taken the opposite position. The court also rejected the argument that the
defendant's diet book was similar to aviation and navigation charts. 38 2 In the
372. Id.
373. Id. (citing Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971); Robb v. Gylock Corp., 120
A.2d 174 (Pa. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 310, 311, 388, 390, 402A, 557A
(1965)).
374. Id. at 125-26 & n.2 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 761 (1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-49 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1964); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1919)).
375. Id. at 126.
376. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
377. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 310, 311, 557A (1965)).
378. See id. (citing Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 388 (1965)).
379. See id. (citing Incollingo, 282 A.2d 206; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388
(1965)).
380. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
381. Id. (citing Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802, 803 (S.D. Tex. 1983);
Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1057 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965)).
382. Id. at 127 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
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court's view, the chart cases involved "extremely technical and detailed
materials ... upon which a limited class of persons imposed absolute trust
having reason to believe in their unqualified reliability."383 In contrast, The Last
Chance Diet was not extremely technical, nor was it was sold to a limited class
of people.384 Moreover, readers of the book were free to exercise their own
judgment about choosing which aspects of the diet to follow.385  For these
reasons, the court in Smith affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of the publisher.386
Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc., a more recent case, also involved a
diet book. In that case, the plaintiff purchased the 1999 and 2002 editions of Dr.
Atkins ' New Diet Revolution and went on the high-protein, low-carbohydrate diet
prescribed in the book.388 While he was on the diet, the plaintiffs cholesterol
level increased from 146 milligrams per deciliter to 230 milligrams per deciliter
in two months.389 Eventually, the plaintiff developed a blocked coronary artery,
which required an angioplasty to unclog it and the insertion of a stent to keep it
open. 3 90 Fortunately, the plaintiffs cholesterol returned to normal within two
months after he discontinued the Atkins Diet.3 91  The plaintiff then sued the
Atkins estate and Atkins Nutritionals, Inc. (ANI), a company that sold food
products and nutritional supplements over the Internet for use in connection with
the Atkins Diet.392 The suit was based on strict liability, negligent
misrepresentation, and deceptive practices in violation of the Florida Deceptive
and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA). However, soon after the
complaint was filed, the federal district court judge granted the defendants'
motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the claims were dismissed.394
The plaintiff s products liability claim alleged that that the food products he
purchased from ANI were defective and unreasonably dangerous.395 In addition,
the plaintiff claimed that the Atkins Diet was a defective product because it
subjected a substantial number of persons who followed it to an increased risk of
cardiovascular disease and other illnesses.396 Turning to the first part of the
products liability claim, the court applied the consumer expectation test to the
food products sold by ANI on its website and concluded that they were not
383. Id.
384. See id. at 124.
385. See id.
386. Id. at 127.
387. 464 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
388. Id. at 319 & n.1, 320.
389. Id. at 321.
390. Id. at 321-22.
391. Id. at 322.
392. Id. at 318, 322.
393. Id. at 323.
394. Id. at 319.
395. Id. at 323.
396. Id.
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defective merely because they increased the risk of heart disease. 39 7
Furthermore, "[t]he average consumer surely anticipates that a high-fat, high-
protein diet would increase both cholesterol levels and the risk of heart
disease."398  Finally, even if high-fat foods were considered to be inherently
defective or unreasonably dangerous, the "$25 worth of protein bars, pancake
mix, and pancake syrup" that the plaintiff consumed was not enough to cause his
heart problems.399
The court also determined that the plaintiffs claim that the Dr. Atkins'New
Diet Revolution book was a defective product must fail because the content of
the book was not a product.4 00 Invoking the reasoning of Winter and Cardozo, as
well as the language of the Products Liability Restatement, the court in Gorran
distinguished between the tangible nature of the book itself and the intangible
nature of the thoughts and ideas expressed therein.401 The court also relied upon
similar reasoning in Smith v. Linn to conclude that the intangible expressions
contained in the Atkins Diet book were not products and, therefore, could not be
defective products. 4 02 Accordingl4, the court ruled that the plaintiffs products
liability claim must be dismissed.
The court also considered the plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation and
FDUTPA violation claims. 4 04  In his negligent misrepresentation claim, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendants negligently misrepresented the risks of the
Atkins Diet, that the defendants intended for him to rely on these representations,
and that his reliance resulted in his heart problems and subsequent need for heart
surgery.405 The defendants responded that the plaintiff failed to allege that the
defendants owed him a duty of care and that their statements were protected by
the First Amendment.40 6 The court agreed with the defendants that plaintiffs
must allege that the defendants owe them a duty of care when making a
negligent misrepresentation claim and holding that the plaintiff in the instant
case had failed to do so.4 07
Turning to the First Amendment issue, the court acknowledged that
negligent misrepresentation claims, like other actions based on allegedly false
397. Id. at 323-24 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)) (citing
Bruner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1360-61 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff'd, 31 F.
App'x. 932 (11th Cir. 2002)).
398. Id. at 324.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. (citing Winter v. G.P. Putnam Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991); Cardozo v.
True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCT LIABILITY §§ 19(a) & cmt. d (1998)).
402. Id. at 325 (Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 126-27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), af'd, 587 A.2d
309 (Pa. 1991)).
403. Id.
404. Id. at 325-29 (citations omitted).
405. Id. at 325.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 326.
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408
statements, were subject to constitutional limitations. The court also pointed
out that the level of First Amendment protection afforded to such statements
depended upon whether they could be classified as commercial or
noncommercial speech.409 The court then determined which type of speech was
involved in the Atkins book and the ANI website.410 First, the court
characterized the Atkins book as "a guide to leading a controlled carbohydrate
lifestyle," not merely an advertisement for the defendant's dietary products.4 11
Relying on the Smith court's analysis, the court in Gorran concluded that the
contents of the book were fully protected by the First Amendment, even if they
caused harm to the plaintiff.412
The plaintiff also claimed that the ANI website negligently misrepresented
413the safety of the Atkins Diet. The court again applied the
commercial/noncommercial speech analysis to statements made on the
website. 4 14 The court agreed that the portions of the website devoted to the sale
of Atkins dietary products were commercial in character.415 Other portions of
the website that discussed nutrition or provided recipes or general health
information were noncommercial.416  However, since the plaintiffs
misrepresentation claim was based on the website's advocacy of the Atkins
Diet-not its promotion of dietary products-the court concluded that this aspect
of the plaintiff s negligent misrepresentation claim must fail as well.417
The court also rejected the plaintiff's FDUTPA claim because it concluded
that FDUTPA only protected against unfair or deceptive conduct that caused
economic injury to someone "in the course of trade or commerce."418 The act
protected against economic losses, not personal injuries.4 19 Because the plaintiff
was seeking to recover for personal injuries-not economic losses-the court
concluded that FDUTPA was not applicable.4 20 Thus, the court dismissed the
408. Id. (quoting Oxycal Labs., Inc. v. Jeffers, 909 F. Supp. 719, 724 (S.D. Cal. 1995)).
409. Id. (quoting World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Bozell, 142 F. Supp. 2d 514, 524
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
410. Id. at 327.
411. Id.
412. Id. (quoting Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), afJ'd, 587 A.2d 309
(Pa. 1991)).
413. Id. at 328.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 327.
416. Id. at 327-28.
417. Id. at 328.
418. Id. at 328, 329 (citing Fla. Office of Attorney Gen. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 420 F.
Supp. 2d 1288, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 2005); Shibata v. Lim, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1317 (M.D. Fla.
2000)).
419. Id. at 329 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.212(3) (West 2010); T.W.M. v. Am. Med. Sys.,
Inc., 886 F. Supp. 842, 844 (N.D. Fla. 1995); Delgado v. J.W. Courtesy Pontiac GMC-Truck, Inc.,
693 So. 2d 602, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
420. Id.
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plaintiff's products liability, negligent misrepresentation, and FDUTPA violation
claims. 421
Courts also have refused to impose tort liability on the publishers of other
types of self-improvement books. For example, in Young v. Mallett,423 the
parents of a young child brought suit against the author and publisher of a book
titled Let's Have Healthy Children. The parents alleged that their child became
injured by ingesting large amounts of vitamin A, as instructed by the defendants'
book.424 The case was primarily concerned with whether New York courts could
assert personal jurisdiction over the book's author, who was a resident of
California.425 Reversing the trial court's decision, the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court ruled that the author's estate could not be sued in New
York.426  In a dissenting opinion, one member of the court suggested that the
legislature may have viewed manuscripts as "goods used or consumed or
services rendered." 427
G. Trade Publications
Customers and others often rely on information about products provided in
trade publications and other forms of trade literature distributed by product
manufacturers. 428 The court in Demuth Development Corp. v. Merck & Co.,
Inc.,429 an early decision, laid down a "no liability" rule-at least where
economic damages were concerned.430  In that case, the defendant, a large
chemical and pharmaceutical company, published The Merck Index-a self-
proclaimed "encyclopedia of chemicals and drugs"-which provided
information about the "general, medical or veterinary uses as well as toxicity" of
"some 10,000 chemicals, drugs and biologicals."431
421. Id.
422. See, e.g., Young v. Mallett, 371 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1975) (discussing a book about
raising healthy children).
423. Id.
424. Id. at 2.
425. Id.
426. See id. at 2-3. The author, Adele Davis died during the litigation. Id. at 2.
427. Id. at 4 (Yesawich, J., dissenting).
428. See, e.g., Newby v. Wyeth, No. 4:11CV00339AGF, 2011 WL 5024572, at *3 (E.D. Mo.
Oct. 21, 2011) (alleging reliance on Patient Education Monographs providing information on
prescription drug); Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990, 991 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(alleging liability for manufacturer's reliance on an encyclopedia of chemicals and drugs to ensure
product's safety).
429. 432 F. Supp. 990.
430. See id. at 993-94 (citing Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 447 (N.Y. 1931);
Jaillet v. Cashman, 139 N.E. 714, 714 (N.Y. 1923); Kings Creations Ltd. v. Conde Nast Publ'ns,
Inc., 311 N.Y.S.2d 757, 758 (App. Div. 1970); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 107 (4th ed.
1971)).
431. Id. at 991.
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In its description of the chemical, triethylene glycol, The Merck Index
suggested that its toxicity was comparable to that of ethylene glycol, a highly
toxic chemical used in antifreeze. According to the plaintiff, triethylene
glycol was not as toxic as ethylene glycol; in fact, it was "completely non-toxic
when inhaled as a vapor and significantly less toxic than ethylene glycol when
ingested orally." 4 33 The plaintiff manufactured a vaporizer that used triethylene
glycol "as a germicidal agent to disinfect the air in hospitals, laboratories and
other places" where it was necessary to maintain a germ-free environment.4 34
The plaintiff alleged that its customers regarded The Merck Index as a reliable
source of information on the "toxic effects of chemicals and drugs."435
Consequently, many of them quit purchasing the plaintiffs vaporizers because
they erroneously believed that triethylene glycol was unsafe for use as an air
sterilizer.4 36  The plaintiff brought suit against Merck, alleging negligent
misrepresentation, and Merck moved for summary judgment.43 7
Quoting International Products Co. v. Erie Railroad Co., the court declared
that there must be a duty to exercise due care before a person can be held liable
for the publication of incorrect information.438 For such a duty to arise between
the plaintiff and the defendant, the following requirements must be satisfied:
There must be knowledge, or its equivalent, that the information is
desired for a serious purpose; that he to whom it is given intends to rely
and act upon it; that, if false or erroneous, he will because of it be
injured in person or property. Finally, the relationship of the parties,
arising out of contract or otherwise, must be such that in morals and
good conscience the one has the right to rely upon the other for
information, and the other giving the information owes a duty to give it
439
with care.
Applying this standard, the court in Demuth determined that Merck
published The Merck Index for a serious purpose, and expected its readers to rely
and act upon it as an authoritative source of accurate information "concerning
[the characteristics of] drugs and chemicals." 4 40 However, the court observed
that the plaintiff did not detrimentally rely on the information provided by
Merck, nor did it show the existence of a "relationship of the parties, arising out
of contract or otherwise" that would give rise to a duty for Merck to exercise due
432. Id. at 991-92.
433. Id. at 992.
434. Id. at 991.
435. Id. at 992.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 991.
438. Id. at 992-93 (quoting Int'l Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R, 155 N.E. 662, 664 (N.Y. 1927)).
439. Id. (quoting Int'1 Prods. Co., 155 N.E. 2d at 664).
440. Id. at 993.
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care on the plaintiffs behalf.4 4 1 Finally, the court concluded that imposing
liability on publishers in the absence of such a relationship would have a
"manifestly chilling effect upon the right to disseminate knowledge." 44 2
Accordingly, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.44 3
H. Advertisements and Endorsements
Advertisements and endorsements have also generated some litigation.444
For example, in Hanberry v. Hearst Corp.,445 the plaintiff was injured when she
slipped on the vinyl floor of her kitchen.446 Contending that the shoes she was
wearing were defectively designed, the plaintiff not only brought suit against the
manufacturer and the retail seller, but also sued Hearst Corporation-the
publisher of Good Housekeeping magazine, which had awarded its "Good
Housekeeping Consumers' Guaranty Seal" to the shoes. 44 7 The plaintiff s claims
were based on negligent misrepresentation, conspiracy, and breach of
warranty. 4 48 However, the trial court sustained Hearst's general demurrer to the
complaint. 449
The appellate court agreed with the plaintiffs contention that Good
Housekeeping did not just routinely accept and publish advertising from all sorts
of manufacturers and retail sellers.4 50 Rather, the magazine actively used its
Guaranty Seal as a marketing device, profiting from the fact that consumers were
more likely to purchase roducts that had been certified by Good Housekeeping
as being of high quality. 1 This led the court to declare:
In voluntarily assuming this business relationship, we think respondent
Hearst has placed itself in the position where public policy imposes
upon it the duty to use ordinary care in the issuance of its seal and
certification of quality so that members of the consuming public who
rely on its endorsement are not unreasonably exposed to the risk of
452harm.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 994.
443. Id. at 995.
444. See, e.g., Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521 (Ct. App. 1969) (asserting
liability against a magazine for certifying that shoes were "good ones and that the advertising claims
made for them in [the] magazine [were] truthful.").
445. 81 Cal. Rptr. 519.
446. Id. at 521.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 520-21.
450. Id. at 522.
451. Id.
452. Id. (citing Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 447 P.2d 609, 617 (Cal. 1968)).
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Having concluded that the plaintiff could proceed against Hearst on a theory
of negligent misrepresentation, the court refused to go further and allow her to
also seek recovery based on strict products liability or breach of warranty.4 5 3
Finding no decision to the contrary, the court reasoned that strict liability and
warranty claims should be limited to those who were directly involved in the
manufacturing and distribution process.454 Extending liability to others, such as
Hearst, might expose them to liability for manufacturing defects when they had
no ability to examine individual products.4 5 5
I. Maps and Navigational Charts
In contrast to cases involving other types of publications, courts have
uniformly imposed liability on the publishers of navigational charts when their
products contained inaccurate or misleading information.456 The first reported
case to consider this issue was Times Mirror Co. v. Sisk,457 which was decided in
1978. In that case, the surviving spouses of the crew members of a Pan Am 707
cargo jet brought suit against Jeppesen & Company-the publisher of instrument
approach charts-and its parent company, the Times Mirror Company.4 5 8 The
decedents were killed when their aircraft crashed into Mt. Kamunag while
approaching Manila International Airport in the Philippine Islands.4 9 The
approach chart they were using did not depict Mt. Kamunay or warn of its
presence in the area.
The plaintiffs brought suit on the basis of strict liability in tort and breach of
warranty. 46' At trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs; however, the
trial court granted the defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. 46 2 On appeal, the defendant argued that its charts were neither products
within the meaning of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A nor
453. Id. at 524.
454. Id.
455. See id.
456. See, e.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming the lower
court's decision that a publisher of instrument approach procedures that caused an airplane crash
should be liable for its defective product); Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir.
1983) (affimning the lower courts judgment for a plaintiff for damages arising out of reliance on a
navigational chart); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981)
(affirming the trial court's finding that a chart maker should be held liable for its defectively
designed product); Times Mirror Co. v. Sisk, 593 P.2d 924 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (setting aside a
judgment n.o.v. and ordering judgment in favor of plaintiffs against the publisher of instrument
approach charts); Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (reversing
judgment for a manufacturer of an airplane instrument approach chart and holding that such charts
are products).
457. 593 P.2d 924.
458. Id. at 925, 926.
459. Id. at 925.
460. Id. at 926.
461. Id. at 927.
462. Id. at 925.
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goods within the meaning of the UCC. 4 63 However, the court dodged this issue,
declaring that "[a]lthough we have serious misgivings about whether this is a
products liability case, we need not decide this issue because we find that the
court erred in granting judgment n.o.v. in any event." 4 64 Because the jury found
that the chart was not defective and not unreasonably dangerous, the appellate
court concluded that there was no reason to overrule the jury verdict.4 6 5
A federal appellate court also upheld a trial court's finding that a navigation
chart was defective in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co.4 66 In that
case, an insurance company brought an indemnity action against the chart maker
after settling wrongful death claims for airline passen ers who were killed when
a Bonanza Airlines plane crashed near Las Vegas. The insurance company
maintained that the instrument approach chart for the Las Vegas Airport was
defective.468 The raw data on which the chart was based had been provided by
the Federal Aviation Administration and was correct.4 69 However, the defendant
converted this information-which was originally in tabular form-into a
graphic form.4 7 0 The chart had two graphic depictions: the top portion, or "plan"
view, provided a bird's eye view from above, while the bottom portion depicted
a "profile," or side view, of the approach with a descending line representing the
minimum altitude that the plane needed to maintain to make a safe approach to
the airport.471 The chart was allegedly defective because different scales were
used to portray the plan and profile views, thereby confusing the pilot.47 2
The trial court concluded that the chart was a defective product and ruled in
favor of the insurance company. 47 3 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit declared that,
under Nevada law, a plaintiff could "recover for injuries caused by use of a
product with a defective design which makes it unsafe for its intended use."474
The appellate court also concluded that the lower court's finding that the chart
was a defectively designed product was not clearly erroneous and, therefore,
affirmed its judgment for the plaintiff.475
Shortly thereafter, another federal appellate court decided Saloomey v.
Jeppesen & Co.476 The decedents in Saloomey were killed in a crash near
463. Id. at 927 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-314(2)(c) (2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 402A, 402B (1965)).
464. Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-314(2)(C) (2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 402A, 402B (1965)).
465. Id. at 929.
466. 642 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1981).
467. Id. at 341.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 342.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 341.
474. Id. at 342-43.
475. Id. at 343.
476. 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Martinsburg, West Virginia.47 The defendant's chart incorrectly stated that the
Martinsburg airport was equipped with a full instrument landing system.4 7 8
According to the decedents' personal representative, this error resulted in the
pilot striking a ridge while trying to land at the airport.4 79  The personal
representative brought suit against the chart publisher, Jeppesen, alleging
negligence, breach of warranty, and strict products liabiltT. 480 After a lengthy
trial, the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs on all counts.
On appeal, the defendant argued that navigational charts were services rather
than products and, therefore, were not subject to strict liability.482 First, the court
observed that the charts were not individualized-like architectural plans-but
rather were mass-produced like ordinary products. 48 3 Furthermore, the court
declared that by producing and marketing these charts to the general public,
Jeppesen "undertook a special responsibility, as seller, to insure that consumers
will not be injured by the use of the charts." 484 Finally, the court concluded that
because the charts were mass-produced, Jeppesen could treat damage awards "as
a cost of production to be covered by liability insurance." 4 85 The appellate court
also determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding
that Jeppesen was negligent in manufacturing the map and failing to inspect it
486for errors.
A federal appellate court in Brocklesby v. United States487 also imposed
liability on the publisher of an allegedly defective navigational chart. 4 88 In that
case, personal representatives of the deceased crew members of an airplane
owned by World Airways, Inc. that crashed into a mountain near Cold Bay,
Alaska, brought suit against the publisher of an allegedly inaccurate instrument
approach procedure.4 8  The case was submitted to a jury under theories of
negligence, breach of warranty, and strict products liability. 90 The jury held in
favor of the plaintiffs and the publisher appealed.491 On appeal, the defendant
maintained that the chart was not a product. 49 2 The appellate court, relying on
477. Id. at 673.
478. Id.
479. See id.
480. Id.
481. Id. at 673-74.
482. Id. at 676.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 676-77.
485. See id. at 677.
486. Id.
487. 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985).
488. Id. at 1291, 1297.
489. Id. at 1291.
490. Id. at 1292.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 1294 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
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the reasoning of Saloomey, disapeed and concluded that the chart was a product
because it was mass-produced.4
Finally, in Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co.,494 a California intermediate
appellate court reversed a lower court judgment in favor of the publisher of
navigational charts.495 In that case, a Lockheed Jet Star crashed into the side of
Johnson Hill near Lake Saranac, New York, killing everyone aboard.496  The
defendant's approach chart depicted one hill in the general area, but did not show
the location of the higher Johnson Hill.497 The owner of the airplane filed suit
against the chart publisher on the bases of negligence, breach of warranty, and
strict products liability.498 The lower court entered judgment in favor of the
chart publisher.499
On appeal, the court acknowledged that no California court had found
navigational charts to be products for purposes of determining the applicability
of strict products liability principles.50 0  However, the court adopted the
reasoning of Saloomey and Brocklesby-namely, that charts should be treated as
products because they were mass-produced; therefore, the court concluded that it
was appropriate for publishers to bear the costs of injuries caused by inaccurate
charts. 1 The court also declared that "the policy reasons underlying the strict
products liability concept should be considered in determining whether
something is a product within the meaning of its use ... rather than ... to focus
on the dictionary definition of the word."5
Turning to the question of whether the defendant's chart was defective, the
court applied the Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. decision's two-pronged test,
under which a plaintiff could rely on either the consumer expectation or the risk
utility test to prove that a product was defectively designed.503  The court
concluded that even if the trial court determined that the chart satisfied ordinary
consumer expectations, a jury could have found it to be defective because its
design embodied "excessive preventable danger." 504  Accordingly, the court
reversed the lower court's judgment in favor of the defendant.os
493. See id. at 1294-95 (quoting Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir.
1983); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 341-42 (9th Cir. 1981)).
494. 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Ct. App. 1985).
495. Id. at 70, 75.
496. Id. at 70.
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Id. (quoting Brocklesby v. United States, 753 F.2d 794, 800 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1985),
amended by 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985); Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d
Cir. 1983)).
501. See id. (quoting Brocklesby, 753 F.2d at 800 & n.9; Saloomey, 707 F.2d at 677).
502. Id. at 71 (quoting Lowrie v. City of Evanston, 365 N.E.2d 923, 928 (111. App. Ct. 1977)).
503. Id. at 73 (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978)).
504. Id. (quoting Barker, 573 P.2d at 452).
505. Id. at 75.
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J Medical Manuals, Forms, and PDE Materials
Several cases have involved allegedly defective medical history intake
forms.506 For example, the plaintiff in Appleby v. Miller507 brought a products
liability claim against the publisher of a form that allegedly failed to inquire into
whether the plaintiff had a history of heart problems or whether she should not
take prophylactic antibiotics.sos As a consequence of these omissions, as well as
other omissions on the form, the plaintiff alleged that she "suffered bacterial
endocarditis, coma, brain artery aneurysm, and hemiparesis.', 50 9 However, the
lower court dismissed the plaintiffs suit because it concluded that the form was
not a Jroduct and therefore did not fall within the purview of strict liability in
tort.51  The court also ruled that the plaintiff failed to bring her action within the
applicable statute of limitations period.511
On appeal, the Illinois appellate court declared that, in determining whether
something was a product, courts did not focus on dictionary definitions; rather,
they considered the policy justifications behind strict products liability.512
According to the court, these policies included "the public interest in human life
and health, the manufacturer's invitations and solicitations to use the product, its
representations that the product is safe and suitable for intended use, and the
justice of imposing the loss on the one creating the risk and reaping the
profit."513  Considering these policies, the court concluded that "the medical
form in question was a service provided to the dentist rather than a product
subject to strict liability." 514 In light of the generality of the questions and the
shortness of the form, the court concluded that it would be unreasonable for the
plaintiff to assume that the form was intended to provide a comprehensive
inquiry into a patient's medical history.515 Finally, the court declared that the
real cause of the ylaintiff s injury was the dentist's reliance on the form, not the
form's content.5 1  Therefore, the court upheld the lower court's judgment for the
defendant.517
However, a federal district court recently reached a different result in
Coleman v. Dental Organization for Conscious Sedation, LLC. In that case,
506. See, e.g., Appleby v. Miller, 554 N.E.2d 773 (111. App. Ct. 1990) (affirming the lower
court's dismissal of a plaintiffs products liability claim arising out of an allegedly defective
medical history intake form).
507. 554 N.E.2d 773.
508. Id. at 774.
509. Id. at 775.
510. Id. at 776.
511. Id. (citing ILL. COMP. STAT. § 2-413 (1986)).
512. Id. (citing Trent v. Brasch Mfg. Co., 477 N.E.2d 1312, 1314-15 (111. App. Ct. 1985)).
513. Id. at 775-76 (citing Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1965)).
514. Id. at 776.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. No. 4:10CV798 TIA, 2010 WL 5146603 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 2010).
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the decedent's surviving spouse brought strict liability and negligence actions
against the publishers of various manuals and protocols, claiming that they failed
to provide proper warnings.519 In their motions to dismiss, the defendants
contended that the publications were not products and therefore were not subject
to strict liability or negligence on the basis of their content.52 0 The defendants
relied on the reasoning of the Winter, Smith, and Jones decisions to support their
claim that written ideas and expressions should not be treated as products.5
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, cited the navigational chart cases for the
proposition that information can be a product subject to strict liability when such
522information is inaccurate. The court concluded that the plaintiff had alleged
sufficient facts to "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and
therefore refused to dismiss the products liability claim at such an early stage in
the proceedings.523
The court also refused to dismiss the plaintiffs negligence claim.524 The
court observed that the plaintiff had alleged the defendants owed a duty to the
decedent because they knew that "dentists would utilize the methods,
procedures, products, and protocols on patients." 5 25 Furthermore, the plaintiffs
contended that the defendants downplayed the risks associated with their
sedation products, "failed to provide adequate information about the reversal
agent," and "encouraged the use of the medications that were off label, contrary
to drug manufacturers' recommendations, and without an adequate scientific
basis." The court concluded that these allegations were sufficient to create a
reasonable expectation that sufficient evidence supporting the plaintiffs
negligence claim would be revealed during discovery.52
Patient drug education materials (PDEs) are another potential source of
liability for the dissemination of inaccurate information. Pharmacies often
provide PDEs to their customers when they dispense pharmaceutical products. 52 8
There have been several instances in which patients brought negligence or
misrepresentation claims against PDE publishers for disseminating inaccurate
medical information.529 The courts in two of these cases ruled in favor of the
519. Id. at *L
520. Id.
521. Id. at *2 (citing Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991);
Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217-18 (D. Md. 1988); Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d
123, 127 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991)).
522. See id. at *3.
523. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
524. Id. at *4.
525. Id.
526. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
527. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
528. See, e.g., Cheatham v. Teva Pharm. USA, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1022-23 (E.D. Ark.
2010) (providing an example of a company that published PDE information in electronic databases).
529. See Neeley v. Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-325JAR, 2013 WL 3929059, at
*1 (E.D. Mo. 2013); Cheatham, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 1022; Rivera v. First Databank, Inc., 115 Cal.
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publisher based on duty5 30 and free speech grounds. 53 1  However, in an
unreported opinion, a federal district court in Missouri recently refused to
dismiss a similar claim against a PDE publisher.532 In Neeley v. Wolters Kuwer
Health, Inc., the plaintiff was diagnosed with tardive dyskinesia after taking
metoclopramide-the generic version of Reglan-between November 2006 and
February 2008, to treat her gastroesophageal reflux disease.534 The plaintiff and
her spouse sued various parties, alleging that the failed to warn about the risks
of taking metroclopramide on a long-term basis.
Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. and Wolters Kluwer United States were among
the defendants in this litigation, and the court referred to them collectively as the
"PEM [d]efendants." 536 Although PEM publishers were not regulated by the
FDA, they developed guidelines to assure that PEMs were, inter alia,
scientifically accurate, timely, and up-to-date.537 Nevertheless, the PEM
defendants argued that they assumed no legal duty to the plaintiffs because they
had no relationship with them.538 In addition, the PEM defendants contended
they did not assume any legal duty to the plaintiffs by undertaking to publish the
PEM pamphlets for distribution to drug consumers.
In response, the plaintiffs argued that the PEM defendants were not
"independent publishers" who published books or articles written by others for
sale to the general public; rather, they targeted patients and health providers,
knowing that they would rely on the information contained in the PEMs.540 The
court agreed with the plaintiffs, concluding that even though the PEM defendants
did not have a formal relationship with the plaintiffs, they nevertheless assumed
a duty to the plaintiffS. 54 1 Specifically, the court declared that the plaintiffs had
sufficiently alleged "they were foreseeable third-party beneficiaries based upon
the 'clear foreseeability to harm of [p]laintiff and because the PEM defendants
'voluntarily assumed a duty of care to [p]laintiff under the Restatement
[(Second) of Torts section] 324 and common law duty principles.", 54 2
The PEM defendants also maintained that their publications did not
constitute commercial speech simply because they licensed the publications to
Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2010); see also Newby v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 4:11CV00339AGF, 2011 WL
5024572 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 21, 2011).
530. See Cheatham, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 1022-24.
531. See Rivera, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 5-6.
532. Neeley, No. 4:11-CV-325JAR, 2013 WL 3929059, at *23.
533. No. 4:11-CV-325JAR, 2013 WL 3929059.
534. Id. at *1.
535. Id. at *3.
536.Jd. at *10.
537. Id. at *12.
538. Id.
539. Id.
540.1d.
541. Id. at *13.
542. Id.
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pharmacies for profit.54 3 Furthermore, the PEM defendants claimed that even if
the PEMs were characterized as commercial speech, they were not false; rather,
they were merely incomplete.544 Finally, the PEM defendants argued that they
should be immune from liability because they simply published information
provided by drug manufacturers and approved by the FDA.545 In response, the
plaintiffs stated that the PEM defendants were authors-rather than
publishers546-and therefore had a duty to verify the accuracy of their work.547
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the PEM defendants did not make a
sufficient First Amendment claim to warrant dismissal of the plaintiffs' case at
that point in the proceedings.548
K Trade Association Standards
Finally, several decisions have addressed the issue of whether a trade
association may be held liable for promulgating defective design standards for its
members.549 One such case, Beasock v. Dioguardi Enterprises, Inc.,sso involved
standards published by the Tire and Rim Association (TRA).551 TRA is a not-
for-profit trade association that was founded in 1903 for the purpose of
promoting dimensional standards for tires and rims to allow interchangeability
among the products of different manufacturers.552 TRA did not engage in the
design, sale, manufacture, or distribution of any tires, rims, or other automotive
products. 553
In Beasock, the plaintiff's husband suffered fatal injuries when a 16-inch
truck tire that had been mistakenly mounted on a 16.5-inch rim exploded.554 The
543. Id. at *14.
544.1d.
545.1d.
546. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
that those who publish the work of others do not have to independently investigate the accuracy of
the author's statements); Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co. 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1216-17 (D. Md. 1988)
(holding that a textbook publisher should not be held "strictly liable as publisher for the content of
the books that it publishes"); Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding that retail bookseller had no duty to verify the accuracy of the books she sold).
547. Neeley, No. 4:11-CV-326JAR, 2013 WL 3929059, at *14.
548. Id.
549. See, e.g., Howard v. Poseidon Pools, Inc., 506 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (granting
the defendant's motion for summary judgment for claims arising out of damages alleged to have
resulted from a trade association who was not a manufacturer); Beasock v. Dioguardi Enters., Inc.,
494 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that no liability attached for damages allegedly arising
from trade association activities).
550. 494 N.Y.S.2d 974.
551. Id. at 976.
552. Id. All manufacturers of tires, rims, and related components may join TRA. Id. At the
time of the Beasock litigation, forty-three domestic and eighty-three foreign manufacturers were
members of this trade association. Id.
553. Id. at 977.
554. Id. at 975.
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plaintiff alleged that the 16.5-inch rim was defectively designed because it
permitted a 16-inch tire to easily mount on it.555 In such cases, "the tire bead
will not seat against the rim flange but instead will break with exilosive force,"
as it did when the plaintiffs decedent attempted to inflate a tire. The plaintiff
also claimed that the tire and rim were defective because they did not contain
adequate warnings about the risk of inflating tires on mismatched rims.5 57 The
plaintiff further contended that TRA "approved, adopted, promulgated and
perpetuated" this defective design even though it knew that the design was
dangerous and the accompanying warnings were inadequate.58 In its complaint,
the plaintiff asserted claims against TRA based on strict products liability,
breach of warranty, and negligence. 559
In response, TRA declared that it merely provided a service to the
automobile industry by publishing tire and rim standards to facilitate
interchangeability of products within the industry.560 TRA pointed out that these
standards were not mandatory-but only advisory-and that it did not undertake
to monitor or enforce compliance with the standards.56' Ruling on TRA's
motion for summary judgment, the court acknowledged that there was little
authority on the liability of trade associations for injuries caused by the products
562
of its members. However, the court concluded that the plaintiffs products
liability and breach of warranty claims must fail because these theories could
only be applied to those who directly manufactured or distributed defective
products. According to the court, the only products that the defendant placed
564in the stream of commerce were its publications. Although these publications
did contain tire and rim design specifications, they did not actually cause the
decedent's injuries, and therefore they could not serve as the basis for imposing
liability on the defendant. 565
Turning to the negligence claim, the court observed that TRA had not
undertaken to develop or promulgate any safety measures for the benefit of the
public, nor did it undertake to warn the public about the dangers of tire and rim
566
mismatches. The defendant did not create or establish design standards;
rather, it merely provided a forum for its members to do so.567 Nor could a duty
555. Id. at 976.
5 5 6. Id.
557. Id.
5 5 8. Id.
5 5 9. Id.
560. Id. at 977.
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. Id. at 978 (citing Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1984); Bolm v. Triumph Corp.,
305 N.E.2d 769 (N.Y. 1973)).
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Id.
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to the public be based on TRA's control over rim and tire manufacturers because
it did not have the authority to exercise any control over what its members
produced.56 s Finally, the court declared that there was no legal basis for it to
impose a duty on publishers to avoid disseminating inaccurate information.56 9
Accordingly, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.5 70
Another case, Howard v. Poseidon Pools, Inc.,571 involved standards
published by the National Spa Pool Institute (NSPI), a trade association for
swimming pool manufacturers. 572  NSPI certified swimming pools and
equipment, reviewed equipment, and recommended changes in design. 573 The
plaintiff in Howard was injured when he dove into an above-ground pool that
had a uniform depth of four feet.57 4 He brought suit against NSPI based on
"negligent misrepresentation, strict product liability, breach of warranty and
negligence." 5 75 After reviewing the plaintiffs complaint, the trial court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment.s?6
The court rejected the negligent misrepresentation claim because it "fail[ed]
to allege that the plaintiff relied upon the information" published by NSPI.577
The plaintiff also failed to plead that he was within the class that the defendant
would reasonably expect to rely on any representation the defendant may have
made.578 Furthermore, the court refused to accept the plaintiffs contention that
false representations made to the general public were sufficient to support his
claim for negligent misrepresentation.579
The court also dismissed the plaintiffs products liability claim.so First, the
court pointed out that trade association product certifiers were not within the
type of product sellers and distributors traditionally subjected to strict products
568. Id. at 979 (citing Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (N.Y. 1976); Vogel v. W.
Mountain Corp., 470 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (App. Div. 1983)).
569. Id. (citing Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 115, 116
(N.Y. 1985), amended by 489 N.E.2d 249; White v. Guarente, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319 (N.Y. 1977)
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931); Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276
(N.Y. 1922)).
570. Id. at 979-80.
571. 506 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
572. Id. at 524. For more on NSPI standards, see generally Robert H. Heidt, Damned for
Their Judgment: The Tort Liability of Standards Development Organizations, 45 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1227 (2010).
573. Howard, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Id. at 528.
577. Id. at 525.
578. See id. at 526.
579. Id. at 525-26 (citing White v. Guarente, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319, 320 (N.Y. 1977); Chem.
Bank v. Nat'1 Union Fire Ins. Co., 425 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819 (App. Div. 1980)).
580. Id. at 526.
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liability.s81 In addition, the court observed that trade associations did not have
the ability to spread risks in the same manner as manufacturers and others in the
582distributive chain. Relying on the reasoning in the Beasock case, the court
declared that the publication of information cannot serve as the basis for liability
because it did not directly cause any injuries. 5 83 The court also held that the
plaintiffs breach of warranty claim was subject to the same deficiencies as his
products liability claim.584
The court rejected the plaintiff's negligence claim because it concluded that
NSPI owed no duty to the plaintiff. The court apparently viewed the
plaintiff s negligence claim as a claim based on NSPI's alleged responsibility to
prevent pool manufacturers from producing defective products.s58 However, the
court declared that NSPI would not have such a duty, unless it had the ability to
control the actions of its members.587 In the absence of such ability to control
the manufacture of swimming pools by its members, the court concluded that
NSPI owed no duty to protect the plaintiff from allegedly defective swimming
pools manufactured by independent third parties.
L. Conclusion
Virtually all of the courts in the cases discussed above have refused to hold
publishers of printed material strictly liable for personal injuries or property
damage caused by inaccurate information.589 For the most part, courts have also
rejected negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims as well. 59 0 In cases
involving claims based on strict products liability, courts have not distinguished
between the various kinds of printed material; instead, they have generally
concluded that information was not a product.591 Some of these courts have
emphasized the physical nature of products, while others have focused on their
592
method of production. The first group of cases emphasized the differences
between the tangible and intangible aspects of a product. 593 While the tangible
581. Id. at 526-27 (citing Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944);
Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 524 (Ct. App. 1969); Beasock v. Dioguardi Enters.,
Inc., 494 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1985)).
582. See id. (quoting Escola, 150 P.2d at 441).
583. Id. at 527 (citing Beasock, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 978; Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup.
Ct. 1981)).
584. Id. (citing Beasock, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 978).
5 8 5. Id.
5 8 6. Id.
587. Id.
588. Id. at 527-28 (citing Beasock, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 979).
589. See supra Part W.A-K and accompanying discussion.
590. See supra Part W.A-K and accompanying discussion.
591. See supra Part III. Cases involving inaccurate aeronautical charts are the only exception
to this. See, e.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F. 2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985).
592. See supra Part W.
593. See supra Part W.A-F and accompanying discussion.
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objects-such as books-could be regarded as products, the information
contained therein was considered to be intangible in nature and, as such, would
not be treated as a product. 59 4 Other courts have recognized this distinction by
declaring that, for strict liability to apply, the physical properties of a product
must cause the harm.595 Thus, in Walter v. Bauer, the court refused to hold the
publisher of a science book liable when a child was injured while performing a
science experiment described in the book, concluding that the ruler and rubber
bands used in the experiment caused the plaintiff's injury, not the instructions
provided in the defendant's book.596
A second group of cases justify the imposition of strict liability on the basis
that the defendant's products were mass-produced,597 while another group has
limited strict liability to those who are directly involved in the manufacture or
distribution of the product in question. 5 In Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., the
court refused to subject a magazine publisher to strict liability because it had not
manufactured or distributed the allegedly defective shoes that caused the
plaintiff s injury; rather, the publisher merely endorsed the shoe manufacturer in
its magazine. Similarly, in Beasock v. Dioguardi Enterprises, Inc., the court
refused to apply strict liability principles to a trade association because it did not
manufacture or distribute the defective tires or rims in question. 60 1
594. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The
purposes served by products liability law also are focused on the tangible world and do not take into
consideration the unique characteristics of ideas and expression."); Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals,
Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 315, 324-325 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Because the intangible expressions contained
in the Book are not products, [the] products liability claim, to the extent it is based on the Book, also
fails."); see also Joseph L. Reutiman, Note, Defective Information: Should Information be a
"Product" Subject to Products Liability Claims?, 22 CORNELL J.L. PUB. POL'Y 181, 188 (2012)
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19 cmt. d (1998)).
595. See, e.g., Beasock v. Dioguardi Enters., Inc., 494 N.Y.S.2d 974, 978 (Sup. Ct. 1985)
("[Tlhe publications themselves did not produce the injuries and thus cannot serve as the basis for
the imposition of liability under ... strict products liability."); Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821,
822 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (holding that liability did not attach where the plaintiff was not injured by the
use of the book for the purpose for which it is intended-to be read).
596. Walter, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
597. See, e.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[T'he mass
production and marketing of these charts requires [the Defendant] to bear the costs of accidents that
are proximately caused by defects in the charts." (quoting Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d
671, 677 (2d Cir. 1983))).
598. See, e.g., Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 524 (Ct. App. 1969) ("We believe
this kind of liability for individually defective items should be limited to those directly involved in
the manufacturing and supplying process . . . ."); Beasock, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 978 ("Since [the
defendant] did not manufacture or market [the product] alleged to have caused the injury in this
case, liability cannot be imposed upon it under the theor[y] of strict products liability .....
599. 81 Cal. Rptr. 519.
600. Id. at 524.
601. Beasock, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 978 (citing Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1984);
Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 305 N.E.2d 769 (N.Y. 1973)).
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Other courts characterize something as a product only when it would
promote the policies that underlie strict products liability.602 In Fluor Corp. v.
Jeppesen & Co., a California appellate court held that navigational charts were
products, and consequently subject to strict liability, reasoning that strict
liability's risk-spreading rationale supported the imposition of liability on the
chart maker.603 In contrast, an Illinois court ruled that the distribution of a
medical history form was not the sale of a product, but a service, because it
believed that the imposition of strict liability on those who produced these forms
would not reduce accident costs or promote risk-spreading.604 Applying a
similar analysis, a federal appellate court declared that the informational content
of a textbook on mushrooms was not a product.605
Because most courts have concluded that information is not a product, they
largely avoided any serious consideration of whether distributors of such
information are protected from strict liability under the First Amendment.06
However, a few courts have observed that imposing tort liability on publishers
might be inconsistent with First Amendment guarantees of free speech and
expression.607 For example, one federal district court declared that imposing
liability on publishers for alleged inaccuracies in their medical textbook
"[w]ould chill expression and publication" in a way that was "inconsistent with
fundamental free speech."6 08 Yet the court did not provide any basis for this
602. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that
the policy principles of strict liability include a "determination of how society wishes to assess
certain costs" and "the unfettered exchange of ideas"); Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal.
Rptr. 68, 71 (Ct. App. 1985) C'mhe policy reasons underlying the strict products liability concept
should be considered in determining whether something is a product . . ." (quoting Lowrie v. City
of Evanston, N.E.2d 923, 928 (111. Ct. App.))); Appleby v. Miller, 554 N.E.2d 773, 775-76 (111.
App. Ct. 1990) (citing Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 (111. 1965)) (noting that the
policy justifications include public interest, manufacturer's solicitations to use the product,
representations about the product, and justice of imposing costs).
603. Fluor Corp., 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71 (citing Campbell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 669 P.2d 224,
230 (Cal. 1982)).
604. See Appleby, 554 N.E.2d at 775-76 (citing Suvada, 210 N.E.2d at 186).
605. See Winter, 938 F.2d at 1036.
606. See, e.g., Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 284 & n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (declining
to reach the First Amendment issue but referring to another case's discussion of the issue).
607. See, e.g., Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 315, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(concluding that imposing liability on book publisher for negligent misrepresentation would violate
the First Amendment); Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (D. Md. 1988) (noting
that to extend liability to publishers of books would "chill expression and publication which is
inconsistent with fundamental free speech principles"); Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F.
Supp. 990, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) ("Merck's right to publish free of fear of liability is guaranteed by
the First Amendment .... ); Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 587
A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991) (affirming trial court's finding that the publication of the diet book was
protected by the First Amendment). See also Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 n.9
(9th Cir. 1985) (citing Taylor v. Sentry Life Ins. Co., 729 F.2d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 1984)) (refusing to
consider defendant's First Amendment argument on appeal because it was not raised at trial).
608. Jones, 694 F. Supp. at 1217-18.
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conclusion.6 09 A Pennsylvania appellate court also considered the effect of the
First Amendment on publisher liability in a case involving a diet book.610 In that
case, the plaintiff objected to the trial court's conclusion that the publisher was
protected from tort liability by the First Amendment. 6 1 1 The appellate court
agreed that none of the established exceptions to First Amendment protection
were applicable and upheld the lower court's decision.6 12
Other courts have expressed a more generalized concern regarding the
potential chilling effect that imposing strict liability on publishers would have on
the dissemination of ideas and information.613 For example, the federal appellate
court in Winter cautioned that while strict liability's risk-spreading rationale
might be appropriate when applied to defective tangible products, it is less
persuasive when applied to words and ideas.614 According to the court, "[t]he
threat of liability without fault (financial responsibility for our words and
ideas ... ) could seriously inhibit those who wish to share thoughts and
theories.",6s The federal district court in Lewin v. McCreight echoed similar
sentiments, declaring that in light of the "weighty societal interest in free access
to ideas," it would be unwise to impose liability for "defective ideas" on
publishers of how-to books. 16
Finally, some courts have suggested that liability may be imposed on
617publishers whose products are mass-produced. This rationale has been used to
distinguish mass-produced navigational charts from custom-made or one-of-a-
kind plans-like architectural or engineering plans-that were developed for a
specific application.618 While the production of custom-made plans could be
treated as a service, some courts have held that it is reasonable to treat mass-
produced materials as products.6 19  Though courts are willing to apply this
analysis to navigation charts, they have declined to extend it to textbooks,
cookbooks, travel books, how-to books, and diet books-all of which are
609. See id.
610. Smith, 563 A.2d at 125-26 (citations omitted).
611. Id. at 125.
612. Id. at 126.
613. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Strict
liability principles even when applied to products are not without their costs. Innovation may be
inhibited."); Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publ'ns, Inc., 833 P.2d 70, 75-76 (Haw. 1992)
(discussing the "chilling effect which liability would have upon publishers"); Jones, 694 F. Supp. at
1217 (asserting that applying strict liability to publishers of books could "chill expression and
publication which is inconsistent with fundamental free speech principles"); Walter v. Bauer, 439
N.Y.S.2d 821, 822-23 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (stating that the plaintiff s theory of strict liability could have
a chilling effect on the First Amendment).
614. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1035.
615. Id.
616. Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 284 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
617. See, e.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing
that mass-production constituted a consideration in finding a product defective (quoting Saloomey
v. Jeppsen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1983))).
618. See id. at 1295 (quoting Saloomey, 707 F.2d at 676-77).
619. See id. (quoting Saloomey, 707 F.2d at 676-77).
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produced in greater numbers. 62 0 This refusal suggests that the mass-production
analysis does not provide a sound basis for determining which kinds of written
materials should be considered products for the purposes of applying strict
liability.
IV. INFORMATION DISSEMINATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM
This portion of the article considers which liability principles should apply
when information that causes injury is embodied in a purely electronic form,
including information transmitted to consumers by the Internet, by computer
software embedded in a product that causes it to malfunction, by stand-alone
software that is embodied in a tangible medium (such as a CD), or by software
that is purchased and downloaded from the vendor's website. Unfortunately,
much of what follows is necessarily speculative because very few cases are
directly on point.
A. Information on Internet Websites
A tremendous amount of information is available on Internet websites.
Sources of information include (1) information provided by manufacturers and
retail sellers about their products on official company websites, (2) information
provided on websites owned by third-party sellers who are not directly in the
chain of distribution, (3) information provided to subscribers for a fee, and (4)
information provided gratuitously to the public by commercial and
noncommercial entities. Under existing law, the liability of a website owner
who publishes inaccurate information over the Internet may depend on which of
the above categories best defines the particular website. 62 1
620. See, e.g., Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 1977) (refusing to
extend UCC's warranty provisions to the content of cookbooks); Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel
Publ'ns, Inc., 833 P.2d 70, 78 (Haw. 1992) (quoting Saloomey, 707 F.2d at 677) (refusing to allow
plaintiff to recover from publisher of travel guide for injuries under strict products liability and
refusing to hold that a book is a product); Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263,
1267 (111. App. Ct. 1985) (refusing to hold that a "how-to" book was a product because "[t]he scope
of liability would extend to an undeterminable number of potential readers"); Walter v. Bauer, 439
N.Y.2d 821, 822 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (refusing to declare that a textbook is a product and refusing to
impose liability on textbook publishers); Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989),
affd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)) (refusing
to impose liability on diet book publisher for protein diet because the book was not a product).
621. Social network services, like Facebook and Twitter, constitute another category and
present potential liability issues, such as defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
See, e.g., Farquharson v. Metz, No. 13-10200-GAO, 2013 WL 3968018, at *1 (D. Mass. July 30,
2013) (indicating that plaintiff alleged defendant used Facebook to intentionally inflict emotional
distress); Brocato v. City of Baker City, No. 2:10CV592-SU, 2012 WL 1085493, at *3 (D. Or. Jan.
4, 2012) (involving a plaintiff that alleged that city councilors made defamatory comments about
plaintiff's termination on Facebook). However, these sites do not serve as platforms for commercial
activities. See generally What Is a Facebook Page?, Help Center, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/help/174987089221178 (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (discussing how
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Websites maintained by manufacturers of automobiles, farm machinery, or
home appliances, along with those maintained by retail stores, often contain
information, such as instructions for assembly, operation, and maintenance;
performance characteristics; safety history; warnings; and warranty
information. 2  Internet pharmacies, as well as sellers of dietary supplements
and health foods, also provide a great deal of information about the health
benefits of the products they sell.623
If such information on the Internet is intended to induce customers to
purchase a product, it may resemble an express warranty, or a product
description, on which potential purchasers can be expected to rely.624 If the
website purports to provide information about product safety, it can be
625categorized as a warning or an instruction. It should not matter that the
information is conveyed in electronic-rather than printed-form, as long as the
information is connected to the potential sale of a new product. Therefore, the
reasoning of the cases discussed in Part II suggests that product sellers will be
subject to strict liability whenever this information is inaccurate and causes
businesses can use Facebook to grow their clientele); How Twitter Ads Can Help Your Business,
Help Center, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/20170393-how-twitter-ads-can-help-
your-business (last visited Oct. 14, 2014) (discussing the various ways in which businesses can
promote themselves on Twitter via advertisements and accounts).
622. See, e.g., Sitemap, FORD, http://www.ford.com/help/sitemap/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013)
(providing an example of the information available on an automobile company's website); Sitemap,
GEN. ELECTRIC, http://www.ge.com/sitemap (providing an example of information available on a
home appliance company's website); Sitemap, GEN. MOTORS,
http://www.gm.com/toolbar/sitemap.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (providing an example of the
information available on an automobile company's website); Sitemap, JOHN DEERE
http://www.deere.com/wps/dcom/enUS/SiteMap.page? (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (providing an
example of the information available on a farm machinery company's website); Sitemap, SEARS
BRANDS, LLC, http://www.sears.com/shc/s/smv 10153_12605 (last visited Oct. 14, 2013)
(providing an example of a retail store's company's website); TARGET BRANDS, INC.,
http://www.target.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (providing an example of a retail store's website).
623. See generally GNC, http://www.gnc.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (providing
information about health benefits and products that the company sells); HERBSPRO,
http://www.herbspro.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (providing information about health benefits
and products that the company sells); IHERB, http://www.iherb.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2013)
(providing information about health benefits and products that the company sells); PURITAN'S
PRIDE, http://www.puritan.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (providing information about health
benefits and products that the company sells); VITACOST, http://www.vitacost.com (last visited Oct.
14, 2013) (providing information about health benefits and products that the company sells).
624. See, e.g., Farrey's, Inc. v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 103 F. Supp. 480, 490 (1952)
("[Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty
if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the
goods.").
625. See, e.g., Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 860 (5th Cir. 1967) (citing
Hardy Cross Dillard & Harris Hart, II, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn,
41 VA. L. REV. 145, 147 (1955)) ("Directions tell how to use the product efficiently while warnings
tell the dangers involved.").
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physical harm to product users and consumers, regardless of whether it is
distributed in written or electronic form. 6 26
A second category of Internet sites is maintained to facilitate the sale of
products by sellers who are not directly in the original chain of distribution.
Craigslist and eBay are examples of this type of operation.627 If a purchaser is
harmed because inaccurate information was provided by the seller-as opposed
to the operator of the website-the seller could be held liable for breach of
warranty, or even under a strict liability standard.628 However, because website
owners are not sellers-like auctioneers or brokers-they probably would escape
liability for product-related injuries, unless they had actual knowledge that the
information provided by the seller was inaccurate.
A third category involves website information that is not readily available to
the general public, but provided to subscribers for a fee. LexisNexis and
Westlaw are examples of this this type of enterprise. Since most information in
this category is economic or commercial in nature, it is unlikely to cause
physical injuries; therefore, the economic loss rule will prevent recovery under
tort law for any economic damages.629 In these cases, victims will have to rely
on warranty law for any recourse against website owners.6 30 Even if inaccurate
information causes physical injury to a subscriber, the owner of the offending
website could still escape strict liability by arguing that providing information-
even on a compensated basis-is not the sale of a "product," but rather, the
furnishing of a service. 6 3 1 Indeed, the cases discussed above involving the sale
of information in printed form lend some support to this view.632 Thus, a
626. See supra Part II.A-K and accompanying discussion.
627. CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.org (facilitating classified advertisements such as jobs,
housing, personal services, and goods from third parties); EBAY, INC., http://www.ebay.com (last
visited Oct. 14, 2013) (facilitating the sale of goods by third parties in an auction format).
628. There are several reasons why it is unlikely that a seller would be subject to strict liability
in these circumstances. First, many of them are casual sellers who would not qualify as "[olne
engaged in the business of selling." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 1 (1998). Secondly, most of the products sold in these venues are used, not new. Although the
Products Liability Restatement imposes strict liability on the sellers of used products in some cases,
these are exceptions to the general rule. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 8 (1998).
629. See Michael R. Maule, Comment, Applying Strict Products Liability to Computer
Software, 27 TULSA L.J. 735, 745 (1992) (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 279, § 101, at 708).
630. See Francis E. Zollers et al., No More Soft Landings for Software: Liability for Defects in
an Industry That Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 745, 757
(2005).
631. See Seldon J. Childers, Comment, Don't Stop the Music: No Strict Products Liabilityfor
Embedded Software, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 125, 140 (2008).
632. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
that plaintiffs who became ill after relying on information from a book could not recover against
book's publisher under a products liability theory).
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website owner may be subject to liability under negligence principles, but not on
a strict products liability basis. 63 3
Finally, thousands of websites on the Internet are operated by non-sellers
who provide information gratuitously to the general public. For example, a
number of websites provide medical advice or health information.634 Some of
these sites are maintained by commercial organizations, while others are
operated by trade associations, such as the American Medical Association,635 or
nonprofit entities like the American Cancer Society636 and the Mayo Clinic. 63 7
Another group of specialized websites, such as Epicurious and the Food
Network, publish recipes and other information about food preparation and fine
638dining. Some websites, such as How Stuff Works, provide guidance on how
to perform various tasks or projects. 639 Other examples include sites that are
devoted to performing high school chemistry experiments, 64 0 makin electrical
repairs,6 4 1 and engaging in other potentially dangerous activities.642 Another
group of websites provide weather64 3 and travel644 information. Finally,
633. See, e.g., Childers, supra note 631, at 140 & n.63 (explaining that established law
requires the plaintiff to prove fault under ordinary negligence if software is considered a service
instead of a product).
634. See, e.g., FAMILYDOCTOR.ORG, http://www.familydoctor.org (last visited Oct. 14, 2013)
(providing medical information regarding diseases, conditions, prevention, and family wellness);
Health and Living Center, MEDICINENET.COM,
http://www.medicinenet.com/health-andliving/focus.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (providing
medical disease information, symptom checking and healthy-living advice); Health and Wellness,
CARE2, http://www.care2.com/greenliving/health-wellness (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (providing
information regarding healthy living); What We Do For Our Users, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/about-webmd-policies/about-what-we-do-for-our-users (last visited Oct.
14, 2013) (providing free medical information and symptom checking to the public).
635. See AMA Resources, AM. MED. Ass'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-
resources.page? (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
636. See AM. CANCER SOC'Y, http://www.cancer.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
637. See Health Information, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health-information
(last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
638. See EPICURIOUS, http://www.epicurious.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); FOOD
NETWORK, http://www.foodnetwork.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
639. See HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://www.howstuffworks.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2013)
(providing insight into the way items function).
640. See Worked Chemistry Problems, ABOUT.COM CHEMISTRY,
http://www.chemistry.about.com/od/workedchemistryproblems/a/workedproblems.htm (last visited
Oct. 15, 2013) (providing ideas and instructions on how to perform chemistry experiments).
641. See, e.g., ELECTRONIC REPAIR GUIDE, http://www.electronicrepairguide.com (last visited
Oct. 15, 2013) (providing ideas and tips on electronic repairs for all skill levels).
642. See, e.g., How-To Guides and Videos, AUTOMD, http://www.automd.com/how-to/ (last
visited Oct. 15, 2013) (providing information regarding automobile repairs); Hunting, N.Y. ST.
DEPARTMENT ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/outdoor/hunting.html (last visited
Oct. 15, 2013) (providing information regarding hunting); THIS OLD HOUSE,
http://www.thisoldhouse.com/toh (providing information regarding household repairs).
643. See, e.g., INTELLICAST, http://www.intellicast.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (providing
national, state, and local weather information); WEATHER CHANNEL, http://www.weather.com (last
visited Oct. 15, 2013) (providing weather information and weather-related news stories).
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numerous sites, such as Wikipedia, provide general or specialized information
about thousands of topics.64 5
Much of the information dispensed by these websites is similar to
information published in written form. For example, Jones v. JB. Lopincott
Co., Young v. Mallett, and Smith v. Linn involved faulty health advice, while
Cardozo v. True concerned an unsafe recipe.647  Walter v. Bauer, Lewin v.
McCreight, and Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., Inc. all involved how-to
instructions causing injuries, 64 8  while Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel
Publications, Inc. dealt with inaccurate travel information. 64 9 Finally, Winter v.
G.P. Putnam's Sons and Demuth Development Corp. v. Merck & Co. involved
more generalized information. so What these cases all have in common is that
the courts uniformly refused to hold the publishers strictly liable for
disseminating allegedly inaccurate information. 6i Therefore, courts would
likely be equally reluctant to impose strict liability on those who provide such
information over the Internet. Even negligence claims may be difficult to
maintain in these cases.
B. Computer Software
Computer software is used to help fly airplanes, monitor hospital patients,
operate nuclear power plants, and-at least to some extent-to control the
operation of motor vehicles, household appliances, and other machinery.65 2
Obviously, the potential for personal injury is eat if defective computer
programming causes these products to malfunction. For example, reports say
644. See, e.g., Maps & Directions, MAPQUEST, http://www.mapquest.com (last visited Oct.
15, 2013) (providing travel information, maps, and directions for locations world-wide).
645. See, e.g., WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilMain Page (last visited Oct. 15, 2013)
(providing user-generated information on an untold number of topics).
646. See Jones v. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 1988); Young v. Mallett, 371
N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (App. Div. 1975); Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 124 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 587
A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991).
647. See Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
648. See Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 282-83 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Alm v. Van
Nostrand Reinold Co., 480 N.E. 2d 1263, 1264 (111. App. Ct. 1985); Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d
821, 822 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
649. See Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publ'ns, Inc., 833 P.2d 70, 73 (Haw. 1992).
650. Winter v. G.P. Puntam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991); Demuth Dev. Corp.
v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
651. See Winter, 938 F.2d at 1037-38; Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1218
(D. Md. 1988); Lewin, 655 F. Supp. at 284; Demuth Dev. Corp., 432 F. Supp. at 995; Cardozo, 342
So. 2d at 1057; Birmingham, 833 P.2d at 79; Alm, 480 N.E.2d at 1267; Young v. Mallett, 371
N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (App. Div. 1975); Walter, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 822-23; Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2dl23 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991).
652. See Jonathan K. Gable, Note, An Overview of the Legal Liabilities Facing Manufacturers
ofMedical Information Systems, 5 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 127, 127 (2001).
653. See Maule, supra note 629, at 735-36 (discussing the consequences of computer
malfinctions in the context of air traffic control operation, radiation therapy, and subway systems).
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that a software glitch in a Therac 25 accelerator, which was used to monitor
radiation therapy, caused cancer patients to receive excessive doses of
radiation.654 In another case, a Royal Air Force fighter jet was shot down by a
patriot missile because the aircraft's software caused the fighter jet to be
identified as an enemy rocket by the Patriot battery.ss In addition, several
accidents have been caused by inaccurate GPS information or directions.656
Finally, it was reported that a software failure endangered an American astronaut
during a spacewalk in 201 1.657
Thus, the issue becomes whether, and on what basis, software manufacturers
should be held strictly liable for consumer injuries caused by their software
issuing improper commands to computers. As far as strict products liability is
concerned, liability may depend on whether software is a product and whether
improperly programmed software is defective.658
1. Embedded Software
There seems to be little doubt that a product malfunctioning because of
defective software would be treated as a defective product, and the manufacturer
of that product would be subject to strict liability for any injuries suffered by
users, consumers, or foreseeable bystanders. 6 59 However, it is unclear whether
654. See Patrick T. Miyaki, Comment, Computer Software Defects: Should Computer
Software Manufacturers be Held Strictly Liable for Computer Software Defects?, 8 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 121, 122 (1992) (citing Cheryl S. Massingale & A. Faye Borthick,
Risk Allocation for Injury Due to Defective Medical Software, 11 J. PROD. LIAB. 181, 181-84
(1988)).
655. See Zollers et al., supra note 630, at 754-55 (citing 'System Error'Link to RAF Deaths,
BBC NEWS, May 14, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiluk-news/3714251.stm (last visited Oct. 15,
2013); Tornado GR4/GR4A, ROYAL AIRFORCE, http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/tornado.cfin
(last visited Oct. 15, 2013)).
656. See John E. Woodard, Comment, Oops, My GPS Made Me Do It!: GPS Manufacturer
Liability Under a Strict Products Liability Paradigm When GPS Fails to Give Accurate Directions
to GPS End-Users 34 U. DAYTON L. REv. 429, 442-443 (2009) (citing Yuval Azoulay, American
Tourist Stoned by Mob After Accidentally Entering Qalandiya HAARETZ June 25, 2008,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/american-tourist-stoned-by-mob-after-accidentally-entering-
qalandiyah-1.248473; Jennifer Langston, GPS Routed Bus Under Bridge, Company Says,
SEATTLEPI, Apr. 17, 2008, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/GPS-routed-bus-under-bridge-
company-says-1270598.php; Mark Havnes, Trusting GPS, Convoy of Visitors Get Monumentally
Lost, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 5, 2008,
http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=10098426&itype-NGPSID&keyword=&qtype=; Yaron
Steinbuch & Hoa Nguyen, Driver Blames GPS for Crash with Metro-North Train in Bedford Hills,
BROTHERHOOD LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS & TRAINMEN (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.ble-
t.org/pr/news/headline.asp?id=23809).
657. See Taiwo A. Oriola, Bugs for Sale: Legal and Ethical Proprieties of the Market in
Software Vulnerabilities, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 451, 453 n.16 (2011).
658. See Childers, supra note 631, at 155.
659. See id.
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providers of embedded software would be treated as component manufacturers,
or merely providers of a service-like architects or engineers.660
In General Motors Corp. v. Johnston,661 a seven-year-old child was killed in
an accident while riding in a truck with his grandfather, who was injured in the
accident.662  The accident occurred when the grandfather's new pickup truck
stalled at an intersection and was struck by a tractor-trailer truck. The
grandfather and the personal representative of the grandson sued GM, alleging
that the pickup truck was defective because a defective programmable read-only
memory (PROM) chip in the TBIIECM system664 cut off fuel to the truck's
665
engine, thereby causing the vehicle to stall. General Motors disputed this
allegation, claiming that the engine had not stalled, but rather, was running when
the collision occurred. 66 Nevertheless, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $75,000
in compensatory damages and $15 million in punitive damages, resulting in an
appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court.67 After rejecting the defendant's claim
668that much of the plaintiff s evidence should not have been admitted at trial, the
court upheld the compensatory award, but reduced the punitive damage award to
$7.5 million.6 69
Although the court did not emphasize the point, it clearly agreed that the
truck was defective within the meaning of the Alabama Extended
Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine.670 That is, the commands programmed into
the truck's PROM chip caused the truck's engine to malfunction, a condition that
rendered the truck defective.671 The jury awarded punitive damages because it
concluded that GM was aware of the problem and failed to alert its customers. 67 2
673Sparacino v. Andover Controls Corp. involved negligence and products
liability claims against emergency management system (EMS) manufacturer
Andover, as well as Communications Management Corporation (CMC)-which
installed the EMS in the high school where the plaintiff worked as a chemistry
teacher.674 The plaintiff arrived at the school around 6:00 A.M. to prepare for a
660. See id.
661. 592 So. 2d 1054 (Ala. 1992).
662. Id. at 1055.
663. Id.
664. "TBI" stands for throttle body injection and "ECM" stands for electronic control module.
Id. at 1056. Together, this system controls several engine functions, including the operation of the
fuel delivery system. Id.
665. Id.
666. Id.
667. Id. at 1057.
668. Id. at 1057-59.
669. Id. at 1064.
670. See id. at 1056, 1061.
671. See id. at 1061.
672. Id.
673. 592 N.E.2d 431 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
674. Id. at 432.
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chemistry experiment that would enable his students to produce chlorine gas. 675
The plaintiff intended to activate a large exhaust fan in the chemistry laboratory
that was located directly above the chemical solution he had prepared for the
experiment.676 However, the fan did not turn on, and the _plaintiff became
severely injured after inhaling the deadly chlorine gas fumes.67  The fan failed
to operate because the EMS had programmed it to remain inactive until 6:30
A.M. 78 Neither Andover nor CMC posted a warning that informed teachers the
fan would not be activated until 6:30 A.M., nor did they install an override switch
to activate the fan in an emergency.679
The plaintiff brought design defect and failure-to-warn claims against
Andover and CMC.680 When the trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of Andover, both the plaintiff and CMC-who had filed counterclaims against
681Andover for contribution-appealed. In pretrial proceedings, Andover's
marketing director, Robert Klein, testified that the company did not install or
682program the EMS. In fact, the EMS was "user programmable," which enabled
the user to program the system with the options and functions needed to meet the
user's specifications.683 Andover shipped the EMS to CMC-without any
embedded program-and CMC installed an application program in accordance
with the specifications provided by the high school.684 Additionally, because
Andover did not supply the exhaust fan switch, it could not have provided a
mechanical override mechanism to the fan.6ss
In light of this evidence, the court concluded that Andover should be treated
as a component manufacturer.686 In the court's view, "the manufacturer of a
component part has no control over that part once it is sold and has no control
over the final assembly of the machine." Instead, the court determined that
CMC programmed the EMS system that disabled the chemistry laboratory fan,
causing the fan not to operate as intended.88 In other words, the fan did not
malfunction because of an inherent design flaw; rather, it shut down because
CMC had programmed it to do so.689 Furthermore, CMC-not Andover-had
the ability to install an override device when it integrated the EMS with the
675. Id.
676. Id. at 433.
677. Id.
678. Id.
679. Id.
680. See id.
681. Id. at 433-34.
682. Id. at 434.
683. Id.
684. Id. at 435.
685. Id.
686. See id.
687. Id. (quoting Curry v. Louis Allis Co., 427 N.E.2d 254, 258 (111. App. Ct. 1981)).
688. Id.
689. See id.
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school's HVAC system. 690 Finally, the court found that Andover could not have
foreseen that a chemistry experiment would be conducted when no one was
scheduled to be in the school; therefore, it had no duty to provide a warning that
the fan would be inoperable during certain periods of time.691 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the granting of summar judgment for Andover on both the strict
liability and the failure-to-warn claim.
The court in Sparacino did not consider whether CMC's program was
defective in any way. 693 In fact, Mr. Klein acknowledged that many schools and
universities program exhaust fans and other devices on an occupancy schedule
because students and teachers often fail to turn them off.694 Therefore, if CMC
were held liable, it probably would be on the basis of failure-to-warn or failure to
install a manual override switch on the exhaust fan, not for a defect in the EMS
programming.695  696
Turner v. Isecuretrac Corp., an unreported decision by an Ohio
intermediate appellate court, involved a monitoring device that failed to function
properly. 697 Viva Turner, the plaintiff in that case, was a victim of domestic
violence. A local court issued a civil protective order against the plaintiffs
husband, David Turner, and ordered him to wear a GPS monitoring device
manufactured by the defendant, iSecuretrac Corporation. 6 99 As a condition of
his probation, the court also ordered Turner to leave the county and temporarily
reside at his house near Lake Erie.7 00 When placed on Turner's ankle, the device
in question would transmit information about his location to law enforcement
authorities.7 0' However, the device did not transmit this information in real time,
but only after it had been downloaded.702  Unfortunately, the device that was
supposed to be placed on Turner's ankle could not be activated, and before
iSecuretrac could send Turner's probation officer a replacement, Turner broke
into the plaintiff's house and assaulted her, causing serious injuries.703
The plaintiff brought suit against iSecuretrac, alleging that the GPS
monitoring device was defectively manufactured.704 The plaintiff also claimed
that iSecuretrac negligently failed to promptly provide a new GPS monitor when
690. Id.
691. Id. at 435-436.
692. Id.
693. See id. at 435.
694. Id. at 436.
695. See id. at 435-36.
696. No. 03CA70, 2004 WL 944386 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2004).
697. Id. at *1.
698. Id.
699. Id.
700. Id.
7 0 1. Id.
702. Id.
703. Id.
704. Id. at *5.
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it learned that the original device was not operating properly. 705 However, the
trial court ruled that there was no evidence the original device was defective
706
when it left the manufacturer's possession. Moreover, because the device was
not defective, the defendant was not negligent in providing a replacement more
promptly. 7 07 Accordingly, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
Affirming the lower court's ruling, the Ohio appeals court concluded that the
GPS monitoring device could have been "previously damaged by another felon,
broken during shipping or damaged while stored at the Fairfield County
Probation Department."70 Therefore, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the court declared that it was mere speculation to conclude that the GPS
monitoring device was defective when it left the defendant's possession.710 For
this reason, the court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of iSecuretrac."
While they are primarily concerned with issues other than tort liability,
several other cases are worth discussing because they provide interesting
examples of how defective software can cause personal injuries and property
712damage. For example, in City & County of San Francisco v. Factory Mutual
Insurance Co., 7 13 the City and County of San Francisco (CCSF) sued Factory
Mutual Insurance Co. (FMIC) and Bombardier Transportation (Holdings) USA,
Inc., seeking to recover for economic losses and property damage to its track and
several of its train cars after a collision between two trains.714 CCSF and
Bombardier entered into a contract under which Bombardier would provide
CCSF with its light-rail train system at the San Francisco International
715Airport. CCSF also purchased an insurance policy from FMIC to protect itself
against property damage and any extra expenses that might result from such
property damage.
CCSF sought to force FMIC to pay for time-element losses that the City
incurred as a result of the accident. FMIC contended that the policy did not
705. Id. at *4.
706. Id.
707. Id.
708. Id. at *2.
709. Id. at *5.
710. Id.
711. Id. at *8.
712. See, e.g., West v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 10-cv-214-JL, 2011 WL 6371791, at
*1 (D.N.H. Dec. 20, 2011) (addressing suit against manufacturer for injuries caused during
helicopter crash that resulted from a digital control shutdown); City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Factory Mut.
Ins. Co., No. C04-5307 PJH, 2006 WL 3544979, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2006) (addressing liability
for damage caused by train collision as a result of software malfunction).
713. 2006 WL 3544979.
714. Id. at *1.
715. Id.
716. Id.
717. Id. at *2.
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cover this type of loss. Bombardier sued CCSF for breach of contract due to the
failure to procure the type of insurance required by the contract between them.71 9
The parties stipulated that the collision was caused by a software malfunction. 719
After discovery was completed, each of the three parties filed motions for
summary judgment.7 20  The court denied CCSF and FMIC's motions, but
granted Bombardier's motion for summary 2udgment. 721
West v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., on the other hand, involved pretrial
requests for the production of documents. 72 3 In that case, the plaintiff became
injured when the helicopter he was piloting lost power and crashed.724 The
plaintiff contended that the crash was caused by an "uncommanded shutdown,"
in which fuel to the aircraft's engine was cut off without warning due to a
problem with the helicopter's electronic control unit (ECU)-part of the "Full
Authority Digital Engine Control" (FADEC) system.725 According to the
plaintiff, "the computer seized control of the engine," causing a malfunction in
the hydromechanical unit (HMU), a device that interfaces with the FADEC to
726
control the flow of fuel to the engine. The plaintiff sued Bell Helicopter (the
aircraft manufacturer), Rolls Royce Corporation (the manufacturer of the
aircraft's engine), and Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Systems, Inc. (the
supplier and manufacturer of the ECU and HMU components).727 The
defendants objected to the plaintiffs request for the production of certain
documents on relevance and privilege grounds.728 However, the court overruled
the defendants' objections to all but one document request.7 29
Courts have decided a number of cases in which embedded software caused
a product to malfunction, injuring consumers, bystanders, or property. 73 0
However, rarely did a court consider the issue of the software's defectiveness.731
Instead, when a court imposed liability, it did so by finding that the finished
product-not the embedded software-was defective. 73 2 Any liability on the
software supplier is based on an action for contribution or breach of warranty
718. Id.
719. Id. at *3.
720. Id. at *1
721. Id. at *4.
722. No. 10-cv-214-JL, 2011 WL 6371791 (D.N.H Dec. 20,2011).
723. Id. at *1.
724. Id.
725. Id.
726. Id.
727. Id.
728. Id. at *1, 6.
729. Id. at *11.
730. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Johnston, 592 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Ala. 1992) (finding that
an electronic system in a truck was the source of engine malfunction, rendering the truck defective).
731. See, e.g., Turner v. Isecuretrac Corp., No. 03CA70, 2004 WL 944386, at *5 (Ohio Ct.
App. Apr. 28, 2004) (finding conclusion that GPS monitor was defective when it left defendant's
possession to be mere speculation).
732. Id.
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between the manufacturer of the finished product and the software supplier.73 3
This approach enables courts to avoid some of the difficult questions that would
arise if stand-alone-rather than embedded-software caused the plaintiffs
injuries.
To be subject to strict liability, software must be considered a product,
independent of the product in which it is embedded.734  Because embedded
software is usually contained in some sort of physical form-such as a CD or a
microchip-one could argue that it satisfies the tangibility test and, therefore,
qualifies as a product. However, because embedded software is part of a larger
finished product, the rules relating to component products presumably would
apply. Component manufacturers' liability to the consumers of finished
products is summarized in section 5 of the Products Liability Restatement. 73 5
Under this provision, the supplier of a component part is subject to strict liability
for physical harm if the component itself is defective or if the supplier of the
component part "substantially participates in the integration of the component
into the design of the [finished 3roduct" and the "component causes the
[finished] product to be defective."
A number of cases discussed above seem consistent with the Products
Liability Restatement's first alternative.737 For example, in Johnston, CCSF, and
West, the suppliers of the alleged improperly programmed software in each of
these cases could have been held liable under section 5 of the Products Liability
738Restatement. The second alternative is more problematic because it concerns
situations in which the component is not defective for all purposes, but rather, is
inadequate or inappropriate for use in a particular finished product.7 39 In such
cases, it seems unfair to hold the component part supplier liable for the conduct
of the manufacturer of the finished product.740  Of course, the situation is
733. See, e.g., Sparacino v. Andover Controls Corp., 592 N.E.2d 431, 432 (111. App. Ct. 1992)
(involving counter claims of contribution regarding an energy management system installed in a
high school chemistry lab).
734. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1, 19 (1998).
735. See id. § 5.
7 3 6. Id.
737. Id. (explicating the principal that a distributor and/or seller of component parts is subject
to liability if the component in itself is defective). See, e.g., City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Factory Mut.
Ins. Co., No. C 04-5307 PJH, 2006 WL 3544979, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2006) (reviewing
summary judgment motions in a liability dispute involving a train collision in which both parties
agreed that the collision was caused by a software malfunction).
738. See West v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 10-cv-214-JL, 2011 WL 6371791, at *1
(D.N.H. Dec. 20, 2011) (involving a helicopter crash claimed to be caused by a malfunction in a
digital engine control system); City & Cnty. of SF., 2006 WL 3544979, at *2 (involving a train
collision caused by a software malfunction); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Johnston, 592 So. 2d 1054, 1056
(Ala. 1992) (affirming trial court's holding that a programmable read-only memory chip is
defective).
739. See 2 OWENET AL., supra note 3, § 15.3, at 1018.
740. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Yale Indus. Prods., Inc., 202 F.3d 376, 379 (1st Cir. 2000)
(refusing to extend liability for injuries to component maker of loading dock lift because the defect
did not exist in the manufacturer's component itself); Jacobs v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 67
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different when the component supplier actively participates in the design of the
finished product;74 1 however, it is hard to conceive of embedded software that
would fit this scenario.
In theory, an injured consumer may still bring a negligence action against
the producer of defective software, even if a strict liability claim would not
satisfy the Products Liability Restatement's requirements. To prevail in a
negligence action, the plaintiff has to show that the software producer (1) had a
duty of reasonable care, (2) failed to exercise reasonable care when it created the
program, (3) the failure to exercise reasonable care was the proximate cause of
the plaintiffs injury, and (4) the plaintiff did in fact suffer physical injury.743 A
negligence action against a software manufacturer may be based on negligent
programming, negligent software testing, or negligent quality control. 744
However, it might be difficult to win a negligence case against a software
manufacturer. 74 5 First, even though many of those involved in the design and
manufacture of computer software are hig trained, courts are reluctant to hold
them to a professional standard of care. Another difficulty that arises is
F.3d 1219, 1241 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding the restatement section inapplicable due to a lack of
evidence that the component products were defective in and of themselves); Temple v. Wean
United, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ohio 1977) (refusing to extend a component manufacturer's
duty to warn of the potentially dangerous effects of component parts not defective in and of
themselves).
741. See, e.g., Springmeyer v. Ford Motor Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 190, 194-97 (Ct. App. 1998)
(citations omitted) (distinguishing from cases in which a supplier of a component part was found to
have no control over the design of the injury-causing product as a matter of law and refusing to
apply component parts manufacturer defense when the component fan was specifically designed for
Ford engines).
742. See, e.g., Gable, supra note 652, at 142 (citing Diane Savage, Avoiding Tort Claims for
Defective Hardware & Software: Strategies for Dealing with Potential Liability Woes, 15
COMPUTER L. STRATEGIST 1, 2 (1998)) (recognizing a claim for negligence against computer
software or hardware providers).
743. See id.; see also Miyaki, supra note 654, at 125.
744. See Paul A. Mathew, The Next Wave: Federal Regulatory, Intellectual Property, and Tort
Liability Considerations for Medical Device Software, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 259,
291 (2003) (citing Cem Kaner, The Law of Software Quality 192-252 (Mar. 2000),
http://www.kaner.com/pdfs/asmlaw.pdf (explicating the various causes of action for negligence in
the area of computer software law)).
745. See L. Nancy Birnbaum, Strict Products Liability and Computer Software, 8
COMPUTER/L.J. 135, 145-46 (1988) (discussing that when plaintiffs bring negligence actions
against software manufacturers, they have the burden of showing the programmer failed to use due
care); Lori A. Weber, Note, Bad Bytes: The Application of Strict Products Liability to Computer
Software, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 469, 478 (1992) (discussing the likelihood of success against
computer manufacturers in negligence actions).
746. See Lee Kissman, Comment, Revised Article 2 and Mixed Goods/Information
Transactions: Implications for Courts, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 561, 588 (2004). One theory that
would impose a higher standard of care on computer programmers and manufacturers is known as
"computer malpractice." See John Jay Fossett, The Development ofNegligence in Computer Law,
14 N. KY. L. REV. 289, 307-09 (1987) (discussing the concept of computer negligence and its
application by courts); see also Alia Susann Zohur, Comment, Acknowledging Information
Technology Under the Civil Code: Why Software Transactions Should Not be Treated as Sales, 50
2013] 201
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
proving causation.7 47 To prove causation, the plaintiff has to identify who in the
development process was responsible for the programming or manufacturing
error and what exactly caused the plaintiff s injury. 48 All of this suggests that
consumers who are injured by malfunctions of embedded software would be
better off suing the manufacturer of the finished product, not the defective
software producer.749
2. Stand-Alone Software
Stand-alone software that is not embedded in a finished product may be
classified as mass-produced or custom designed. 7 50 The former category refers
to software that is not developed for a particular user and includes products
consumers can purchase "off the shelf' from retailers, or even online. 751
Because mass-produced software can be purchased in this fashion, some
commentators characterize such transactions as "sales of goods" under the
UCC.752 In contrast, custom software is either specially developed to fit the
needs of a particular user or it is existing software that is modified for this
753purpose. Arguably, the development of custom software should be classified
754
as a service.
LoY. L. REV. 461, 494-96 (2004) (citing RAYMOND T. NIMMFR, THE LAW OF COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY § 9.30 (2002)). However, most courts have rejected computer malpractice claims.
See, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 746 (2d Cir. 1979) (refusing
to apply a continuous treatment standard, which relies upon the manufacturer's expertise); Chatlos
Sys., Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 740 n.1 (D.N.J. 1979) (declining to adopt
the theory in the absence of sound precedential authority). But see Diversified Graphics, Ltd. v.
Groves, 868 F.2d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding lower court's application of a professional
standard of care in a negligence action against a computer software company).
747. Gable, supra note 652, at 144 (citing Brian H. Lamkin, Comment, Medical Expert
Systems and Publisher Liability: A Cross-Contextual Analysis, 43 EMORY L.J. 731, 735 (1994)).
748. Id. (citing Lamkin, supra note 747, at 758).
749. See, e.g, id. (citing Lamkin, supra note 747, at 758) (stating that negligence causes of
action are complicated by difficulties in proving causation).
750. Zohur, supra note 746, at 466.
751. Id. at 466-67 (citing Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software
Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 459, 465 (2000)).
752. Brennan, supra note 751, at 465 & n.16 (quoting Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption:
The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 118 n.15 (1999));
see also Douglas A. Barnes, Note, Deworming the Internet, 83 TEx. L. REV. 279, 316 (2004).
Actually, software manufacturers usually license rather than sell mass-produced software. See
Zohur, supra note 746, at 467 (citing CLARISSE GIROT, USER PROTECTION IN IT CONTRACTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE PROTECTION OF THE USER AGAINST DEFECTIVE PERFORMANCE IN
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 103 (2001); Brennan, supra note 751, at 465 & n.16)).
753. Zohur, supra note 746, at 466.
754. See generally Weber, supra note 745, at 473 (citing RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc.,
772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1985); Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 438 (Md. 1983); John
M. Conley, Tort Theories of Recovery Against Vendors of Defective Software, 13 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 1. 3 (1997)) (discussing how software may be characterized as a service
depending on a fact-intensive analysis).
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V. CHANGING THE ExISTING LIABILITY REGIME
A. A Summary ofExisting Liability Rules
Under the existing hodgepodge of liability rules, the choice of a liability rule
depends on whether information is published in tangible form-as opposed to
electronic form-or whether the information is associated with the sale of a
product.755  For example, statements about product quality, performance, or
safety, if known to be false, may also subject the seller to liability for fraud or
misrepresentation if the injured party relies on these statements. Even
statements made in good faith may constitute a breach of express warranty if
relied upon by the buyer.757 In addition, inaccurate warnings and instructions
may give rise to strict liability for a product seller if they cause a product to
become defective.758
In contrast, the publisher of pure information-unconnected with the sale of
a particular product-is usually not subject to liability of any kind. 75 9 As far as
strict liability in tort is concerned, virtually all of the courts considering this issue
have concluded that information is not a product, even when it is published in
some sort of tangible form, such as a book, magazine, audio recording, or video
recording.760 The only exce6ption to this rule applies to cases involving
inaccurate navigational charts.
755. See, e.g., Childers, supra note 631, at 140 (explaining that established law requires the
plaintiff to prove fault under ordinary negligence if software is considered a service instead of a
product).
756. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Chi. v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 592 (111. 1989) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965)) (declaring that a person who gives false
information to another may be liable for physical harm caused by the other's reliance upon that
information).
757. See U.C.C. § 2-313(a) (2012).
758. See, e.g., Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974) (reversing
a finding for defendants because had the jury been properly instructed on the law, the jury could
have found that the warnings were inadequate); Boyd v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 902 N.E.2d 1023 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2008) (reversing summary judgment for defendants because trial court failed to determine
if a warning defect existed before granting summary judgment as to the strict liability claim).
759. See Reutiman, supra note 594, at 188 n.40 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 19
& cmt. d (1998)).
760. Id.
761. See, e.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding an
inaccurate chart to be a product under section 402A); Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671,
676-77 (2d Cir. 1983) (recognizing the mass-produced nature of the navigational charts and finding
the charts to be products rather than services); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d
339, 341 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming the trial court's finding that a chart maker should be held liable
for its defectively designed product); Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 70-71 (Ct.
App. 1985) (stating that the classification as a product would promote and uphold the policies
behind strict liability).
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A few courts have considered whether a publisher of inaccurate information
should be subject to liability for negligence.762 However, courts generally
conclude that the duty of due care does not require publishers to verify the
accuracy of the material they disseminate.763 In theory, authors who submit
inaccurate information to publishers may be liable to injured consumers if they
764fail to exercise due care in obtaining information. However, there are no
reported cases in which a court actually imposed liability on this basis.765
Instead, accident victims usually seek compensation from commercial
766publishers-and not from authors-when they are injured. Finally, publishers
of inaccurate information may be held liable for fraudulent misrepresentation or
breach of express warranty, although successful claims under such liability
768theories seem to be uncommon.
Information may also be disseminated in nontangible form.769 The principal
areas of potential liability involve software and information that is published on
the Internet. Software includes both embedded or intrinsic software, as well as
stand-alone software.770 Embedded software is contained within a product and
controls some aspect of its operation.771 Courts generally agree that a finished
product that malfunctions due to defective software will be considered defective,
and the product's manufacturer may be held strictly liable for any injuries that
ensue.77 However, it is uncertain whether the supplier of defective embedded
762. See, e.g., Jones v. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1216 (D. Md. 1988). Cf Young v.
Mallett, 49 A.D.2d 528, 528-29 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (dismissing a negligence claim against the
author of a self-improvement book for lack of personal jurisdiction).
763. See Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that
publishers have no duty to verify the accuracy of the contents of the books that are published);
Jones, 694 F. Supp. at 1217 (noting that the publisher's duty was limited to publishing and that it
had taken no responsibility for the contents of the book); Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publ'ns,
Inc., 833 P.2d 70, 75 (Haw. 1992) (holding that, absent a showing that the publisher authored or
guaranteed the contents, "a publisher has no duty to investigate and warn its readers of the accuracy
of the contents of its publications"); Aim v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1265-66
(Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (refusing to extend a duty to investigate or test all procedures or products to a
publisher of a magazine).
764. See generally Lars Noah, Authors, Publishers, and Products Liability: Remedies for
Defective Information in Books, 77 OR. L. REV. 1195, 1209-10 (1998) (discussing the challenges of
holding authors and publishers liable for the dissemination of false information).
765. Id. at n.43 (providing examples of cases in which courts have declined negligent
misrepresentation claims against authors based on unreasonable action).
766. See id. at 1209-10.
767. 2 OWEN ET AL., supra note 3, § 20:9, at 480.
768. Noah, supra note 764, at n.43; see also 2 OWENET AL., supra note 3, 20:9, at 481.
769. See Maule, supra note 629, at 712 (discussing the past exclusion of software
manufacturers from strict products liability due to the intangible nature of the software).
770. See T. Randolph Beard et al., Tort Liability for Software Developers: A Law &
Economics Perspective, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFo. L. 199, 201 (2009).
771. See id.
772. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 cmt. b (1998); see also
2 OWEN ET AL., supra note 3, § 19:2, at 423-24.
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software would be liable to an injured consumer as well.7 73 First, it is unclear
whether commands contained in software are information.7 74 Second, even if
software commands are regarded as information, as suppliers of component
products, software providers may not be subject to strict liability unless they
played a significant role in the design of the finished product. 7 75 In the absence
of strict liability, it is possible that suppliers of defective embedded software
may still be held liable to injured consumers for breach of express warranty7 76 or
negligence. However, no cases have been reported in which liability has been
imposed.778
Also, no cases subjecting sellers of stand-alone software to strict liability
have been reported. 77 9 There are two arguments against imposing such liability.
First, according to some commentators, a computer program is a service-not a
product 780-even if it is embodied in some tangible form, such as a compact
disc.78 Second, if stand-alone software is considered a form of information, 2 it
should be treated the same as information in written form.783 Of course,
suppliers of stand-alone software may also be liable for fraudulent
'784 785 ilgne786buliiit
misrepresentation, breach of express warrant, or negligence, but liability
is almost never imposed on any of these bases.
B. Distinguishing Between the Dissemination of Commercial and
Noncommercial Information
The foregoing discussion suggests that it would be desirable to modify the
existing liability regime to make it more coherent and rational. One promising
approach would be to develop a rule that focuses on the difference between
773. 2 OWEN ET AL., supra note 3, § 20:9, at 485-86.
774. See Roy N. Freed, Products Liability in the Computer Age, 17 JURIMETRIcS J. 270, 279
(1977).
775. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 cmt. a (1998).
776. Maule, supra note 629, at 736 (citing U.C.C. § 2-313 (2012)).
777. Id. at 712.
778. Childers, supra note 631, at 142.
779. Id. at 757.
7 8 0. Id.
781. See Freed, supra note 774, at 278-79; Maule, supra note 629, at 752-53.
782. Freed, supra note 774, at 279 (recognizing the common treatment of output as
information).
783. See 2 OWEN ET AL., supra note 3, § 20:9, at 480-83 (explaining that courts have
generally refused to apply products liability law to information conveyed through printed media and
other forms of written information).
784. Maule, supra note 629, at 737.
785. Id.
786. Id.; see also Daniel T. Perlman, Note, Who Pays the Price of Computer Software
Failure?, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 383. 397 (1998).
787. Maule, supra note 629, at 737; Perlman, supra note 786, at 397.
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788commercial and noncommercial information. The United States Supreme
Court has made a similar distinction in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
789Public Service Committee, in which it considered whether commercial speech
should be entitled to the same level of constitutional protection against
government regulation as noncommercial speech.790  In Central Hudson, the
Court reaffirmed that the government cannot normally subject noncommercial
791
speech to prior restraint or regulate it on the basis of content. At the same
time, the Court held that while commercial speech was subject to some
government regulation, it was constitutionally protected against unreasonable
regulation.792
Applying the Central Hudson analysis to the problem of inaccurate
information, one could classify information primarily intended to inform the
public, or to promote a particular point of view, as noncommercial.793 Under this
approach, noncommercial publications would include ideas and information
expressed in some tangible form, such as print, cinema, or compact discs. 79 4
Thus, information or advice contained in textbooks, encyclopedias, cookbooks,
instructional materials, travel guides, diet books, self-improvement books,
medical forms, and trade association standards would all be classified as
noncommercial. Logically, maps and charts would also be treated as
noncommercial. Additionally, this sort of information should be treated as
noncommercial when disseminated in electronic form on the Internet, including
websites maintained by private individuals, government entities, and nonprofit
organizations that provide information free of charge to the general public.
In contrast, information that is disseminated to promote the sale of a product
or the furnishing of a service, as well as information that is disseminated in
connection with the sale of a product or the provision of a service, would be
classified as commercial in nature. 7 95 This would include statements made by
788. See Noah, supra note 764, at 1224 ("Commercial speech doctrine may provide a more apt
analogy for publisher liability than defamation or incitement.").
789. 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (discussing the constitutional limits of restrictions on commercial
speech).
790. Id. at 561-73.
791. Id. at 561 & n.4 (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530,
537-40 (1979)).
792. Id. at 566, 571-72; see also Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First
Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REv. 589, 596-97 (1996) (citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993)) (rejecting the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech).
793. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (defining commercial speech as "expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience" (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1 (1979); Bates v. State Bar ofAriz., 433 U.S. 350, 363-64 (1977); Va. State Bd. ofPharm. v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976))); see also Noah, supra note 764, at
1225-26 ("[Cjommercial speech refers to advertising material that encourages recipients to
purchase a particular product or service.").
794. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 761 (discussing whether statements made
by pharmacists in selling a drug are protected as noncommercial speech).
795. See Noah, supra note 764, at 1225-26.
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product sellers in advertising, sales contracts, or product packaging, such as
product descriptions; statements about product safety; and warnings and
instructions for assembly, operation or maintenance. Furthermore, this type of
information would be treated as commercial whether disseminated in tangible
form or posted on a seller's Internet website. 796 Embedded software should also
be treated as commercial, but software providers should not be held liable unless
they actively participated in the design of the product in question.797 Mass-
produced operating programs-as opposed to video games-should also be
treated as commercial, since whatever information such programs contain has no
artistic value, nor is it intelligible to the general public. 79
The next issue to decide is which liability standard or standards to impose on
those who disseminate inaccurate information. Following the reasoning of the
Court in Central Hudson, the correct approach would be to subject those who
disseminate noncommercial information to a lesser liability standard than those
who disseminate information of a commercial character.79 The four liability
theories presently employed are breach of express warranty, fraudulent
misrepresentation, strict liability, and negligence.800
Breach of express warranty and fraudulent representation should be
available, regardless of whether inaccurate information is commercial or
noncommercial. However, such breaches apply to very specific kinds of conduct
and, therefore, would not apply to most cases.so0 For example, an action for
breach of warranty is usually confined to "transactions in goods," 80 2 and it is
therefore doubtful that pure information would constitute goods under the
current provisions of the UCC.80 In addition, warranties are usually limited to
796. See, e.g., Spirit Airlines v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(citing Va. State Bd ofPharm., 425 U.S. at 762) (classifying Spirit Airlines print and online price
advertisements as commercial speech).
797. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 (1998) (declaring the
supplier of a component part subject to strict liability for physical harm caused by finished product
if supplier "substantially participates" in the design).
798. See generally Noriko Kawawa, Comparative Studies on the Law of Tort Relating to
Liabilityfor Injury Caused by Information in Traditional and in Electronic Form: England and the
United States, 12 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 493, 589-91 (2002) (citations omitted) (discussing the
implication of mass production on computer software liability).
799. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)) (stating that
noncommercial speech is afforded more Constitutional protection than commercial speech).
800. See Conley, supra note 754, at 5, 11, 15, 27; see also Maule, supra note 629, at 736-37.
801. U.C.C. § 2-313 (2012).
802. Ronald N. Weikers, Comment, "Computer Malpractice" and Other Legal Problems
Posed by Computer "Vaporware" 33 VILL. L. REv. 835, 856 (1988) (quoting U.C.C § 2-102
(2012)).
803. See David A. Owen, The Application of Article 2 of the Unform Commercial Code to
Computer Contracts, 14 N. KY. L. REv. 277, 277-78 (1987) (discussing the primary purpose test
employed by courts defining software sold with computer hardware to be "goods" under the UCC);
see also Childers, supra note 631, at 146-49 (recognizing the inherent intangible character of
software).
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transactions between buyers and sellerS804 and, therefore, would not apply to
communications when a contractual relationship between the parties does not
exist. In addition, publishers would have to affirmatively guarantee the accuracy
of the information they publish for an express warranty to arise;so5 however,
most publishers would either refuse to do so or hedge their warranties with
disclaimers or other limitations on liability-as software providers typically do
at the present time.806
Fraudulent misrepresentation is also very narrow in scope. To recover under
a misrepresentation theory, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, both
reliance and intent.807 These requirements are difficult to prove and would
greatly limit the number of victims who might prevail under a fraudulent
misrepresentation claim.sos Thus, while breach of express warranty and
fraudulent misrepresentation might be applicable in certain limited
circumstances, they do not have much potential as universal liability rules in this
area.
This leaves strict liability and negligence. Under a strict liability regime, an
injured party would have to prove that the defendant published the information,
that the information provided was inaccurate, that the defendant owed a duty to
the plaintiff to provide accurate information,809 and that the information
proximately caused a physical injury to the plaintiff.810 However, the plaintiff
would not be required to prove that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable
care s1-or the existence of privity of contract 81-and the defendant would not
be allowed to disclaim or limit its liability.813 Strict liability would presumably
be limited to publishers of commercial information. Several arguments support
the imposition of strict liability upon the publishers of commercial information.
First, the prospect of paying damages to injured parties creates an incentive for
publishers to make an effort to ensure that the information they disseminate is
804. See Maule, supra note 629, at 736.
805. U.C.C. § 2-313 (2012) ("Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty .... ).
806. See Barnes, supra note 752, at 317; Weikers, supra, note 802, at 871-73.
807. Richard Ausness, Conspiracy Theories: Is There a Place for Civil Conspiracy in
Products Liability Litigation?, 74 TENN. L. REv. 383, 400 (2007) (quoting Goldstein v. Phillip
Morris, Inc., 854 A.2d 585, 590-91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)).
808. Ausness, supra note 807, at 401.
809. See Perlman, supra note 786, at 396.
810. See 1 OWENET AL., supra note 3, § 7:10, 423-24.
811. See id. § 7:10, at 424 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965)).
812. See Maule, supra note 629, at 736 (recognizing that privity is required if a theory of
recovery is based on contract law).
813. Disclaimers by the manufacturer and waivers by the buyer "do not bar or reduce
otherwise valid products liability claims against sellers or other distributors of new products for
harm to persons." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18 (1998).
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accurate.81 In addition, those who profit from the dissemination of
information-either directly or indirectly-are usually better able to bear some
of the losses caused by their dissemination of inaccurate information.815
However, potential problems can arise with the application of strict liability.
First, strict liability is usually limited to commercial sellers of defective
816products. Extending strict liability principles to Internet publishers and
software suppliers would require treating this type of information in the same
manner as tangible products-something that courts so far have been unwilling
817to do. Furthermore, the threat of liability may also inhibit the development of
useful products, such as software programs that architects, engineers, and
product designers use in their work.
The alternative is subjecting publishers of commercial information to a
negligence standard. A negligence standard would have a number of advantages
over the strict liability standard if it were adopted as the prevailing liability rule
for the publishers of commercial information. First, from a jury's point of view,
"negligence is 'hot,' while strict liability is 'cold"';8 19 that is, jurors instinctively
understand and relate to the conduct-based evidence required in a negligence
case, while they are less accepting of the cost-benefit analysis underpinning strict
liability.820 In addition, unlike traditional strict liability, negligence does not
require the plaintiff to prove a sale or transfer of a tangible product.821 Thus,
negligence principles can be easily applied without distortion to non-sale
publications.
Of course, the uniform application of a negligence-based liability rule has
some drawbacks. In the first place, it may be difficult for a plaintiff to prove that
the publisher failed to exercise due care, especially when the information in
question is embodied in computer software. 82 Since computer programmers are
not licensed, plaintiffs cannot invoke formal professional standards to determine
whether a particular software glitch is the result of negligence. 82 3 Likewise, it is
unclear whether a negligence standard would require a commercial publisher to
814. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 96, at 681; Maule, supra note 629, at 743 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
815. See Kerry M. L. Smith, Comment, Suing the Provider of Computer Software: How
Courts Are Applying UC.C. Article Two, Strict Tort Liability, and Professional Malpractice, 24
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 743, 759 (1988).
816. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998).
817. See Zollers et al., supra note 630, at 757, 766.
818. See Childers, supra note 631, at 161-66.
819. See Paul D. Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2
HOFSTRAL. REv. 521, 531 (1974).
820. Id. at 531.
821. See Gable, supra note 652, at 142 (enumerating the elements of a negligence cause of
action) (citing Diane Savage, Avoiding Tort Claims for Defective Hardware & Software: Strategies
for Dealing with Potential Liability Woes, 15 COMPUTER L. STRATEGIST 1, 2 (1998)).
822. See Weber, supra note 745, at 478 (citing Birnbaum, supra note 745, at 145-46).
823. Smith, supra note 815, at 760 (citing Conley, supra note 754, at 26).
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verify the accuracy of any information generated by a third party.82 4 Finally, one
can argue that applying a negligence rule to literature distributed in connection
with the sale of a product, which has traditionally been covered by a strict
liability rule, would lessen the legal protection currently afforded to
consumers.825  In response, as both the Products Liability Restatement and a
number of courts have acknowledged, while strict liability nominally applies to
product warnings and instructions, the actual liability standard is negligence. 826
If publishers of commercial information are subject to a negligence standard,
what is left for the publishers of inaccurate noncommercial information?
Arguably, a negligence standard would impose too heavy a burden on those who
disseminate noncommercial information. Time and time again, courts have
expressed concern that holding book publishers and others liable would create a
chilling effect and lead to self-censorship and the suppression of ideas and
828information. While this risk is not as great with a negligence standard as it is
with the strict liability standard, it is still significant.829 However, if negligence
is taken off the table as a liability standard for the publishers of noncommercial
information, the only liability theories left for them are breach of express
warranty and fraudulent misrepresentation. 8 30
In fact, this is pretty close to the current situation. As the foregoing
discussion has shown, those who publish various types of noncommercial
information in tangible form generally escape liability under a strict products
liability theory because courts refuse to treat this type of information as a
product.83' No court has imposed liability based on a theory of negligence
824. See id. (citing Conley, supra note 754, at 26).
825. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998) (stating that
products are defective if they have inadequate instructions or warnings).
826. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a (1998).
827. See Childers, supra note 631, at 161-66.
828. See, e.g., Jones v. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (D. Md. 1988) (denying the
plaintiff's claim against a publisher, in part, because of the potentially chilling effect on free speech
expression).
829. In order to prove negligence against a publisher, a plaintiff would have the burden of
proving that the publisher has a duty to verify the accuracy of the material it publishes. See
generally Brett Lee Myers, Note, Read at Your Own Risk: Publisher Liabilityfor Defective How-
To Books, 45 ARK. L. REV. 699, 723 (1992) (evaluating liability options for publishers of books
with incorrect information). In general, courts have held that there is no such duty. Id. However, if
strict liability standards were applied to the dissemination of information, the plaintiff would have a
much lower burden. See id. To prevail, a plaintiff would simply need to prove that the information
was incorrect and as a result, there were damages. See id.
830. See Conley, supra note 754, at 5, 11.
831. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991) (declining
to impose strict liability on an encyclopedia publisher because it was not a product); Jones, 694 F.
Supp. at 1217 (holding that a textbook publisher should not be held strictly liable for the content of
the books because the content is not a product); Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publ'ns, Inc., 833
P.2d 70, 79 (Haw. 1992) (declining to impose strict liability on the publisher of a travel guide).
210 [VOL. 65: 131
THE DISORDERLY CONDUCT OF WORDS
either.832 Although no cases have been reported, it is likely that courts would
follow this same pattern for information transmitted in electronic form.
Consequently, the better approach may be to shield those who disseminate
noncommercial information from liability, unless they voluntarily warrant the
accuracy of their work product or intentionally misrepresent its character.
To conclude, the optimal approach would be to subject publishers of
commercial information-including product sellers-to a negligence standard,
while holding publishers of noncommercial information liable only if their
information constitutes either a breach of express warranty or a fraudulent
misrepresentation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Various liability rules currently govern the dissemination of inaccurate
information. Inaccurate warnings and instructions provided by product sellers
are-at least in theory-subject to strict liability in tort. In contrast, those who
publish inaccurate information in books, magazines, and other tangible media are
almost never held liable, unless their conduct amounts to a breach of express
warranty or fraudulent misrepresentation. Virtually no legal standard covers
liability for the dissemination of inaccurate information in electronic form. The
only possible exception to this involves a few cases in which manufacturers were
held strictly liable for injuries caused by malfunctioning software embedded in
their products.
This Article proposes an alternative liability regime that distinguishes
between information that is commercial in character and information that is
noncommercial. Those who disseminate inaccurate commercial information in
any form will be subject to a negligence standard. They may also be held liable
for breach of express warranty or fraudulent misrepresentation when
circumstances warrant such treatment. In contrast, those who disseminate
inaccurate noncommercial information will be immune from liability, unless
they breach an express warranty or engage in fraudulent misrepresentation.
Hopefully, this suggested approach will achieve a fair balance between the rights
of injured consumers and the need to avoid discouraging the free flow of
information.
832. Terri R. Day, Publications That Incite, Solicit, or Instruct: Publisher Responsibility or
Caveat Emptor, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 73, 92 (1995) (citing Birmingham, 833 P.2d at 75).
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